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More than one decade after the International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court) 
started work and after the first Review Conference of the Rome Statute held in 
Kampala in 2010, the activities of the Court, its achievements, its general future and 
necessary changings remain controversial. With the introduction of the Rome Statute 
the international community installed the first permanent international criminal court 
in 2002. The ICC followed the ad-hoc tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo after 
World War II established in 1945, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
installed in 1994 and various so-called hybrid tribunals such as the Special Panels of 
the Dili District Court for the situation in East Timor in 2000 and the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone in 2002. Furthermore, although the ICC is based on a treaty and 
therefore generally only applicable to the states that have signed and ratified the 
Rome Statute, under certain circumstances universal jurisdiction is already possible 
today even if many countries, such as the People’s Republic of China (China), the 
Russian Federation (Russia), the Republic of India (India) or the United States of 
America (USA) have not ratified the statute by now. The expectations on the ICC 
with regard to preventing the worst crimes like war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide were and are still very high. Beside other goals, like ‘to end impunity, 
to achieve justice for all, to remedy the deficiencies of ad hoc tribunal, to take over 
when national criminal justice institutions are unwilling or unable to act’, the focus 
of the ICC and the Rome Statute is mainly directed ‘to help end conflicts and to deter 
future war criminals’ and, in this way, avoid further violations of fundamental 
human rights.1  
Africa in general, its countries, its conflicts and its people have always been a ‘hot 
spot’ in the context of unbelievable and horrible human rights violations, which have 
received a lot of international attention. Although human rights violations occur 
around the world and even in the so called ‘Western World’, Africa has always been 
a paragon of such massive human rights infringements.  The ICC, as one more pillar 
in the worldwide human rights protection system, was designed as a further step to 
prevent widespread human rights violations. On the other hand, recent developments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  United	  Nations,	  Overview	  of	  the	  Rome	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court.	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in Africa suggest that the opposition against the ICC is increasing constantly and has 
reached a new height now, since the African Union (AU) has seriously discussed a 
possible ‘en masse withdrawal’ of its members from the Rome Statute during the 
2013 summit of the AU in Addis Ababa. This view has been confirmed in 
subsequent AU meetings. The general opinion of the Court among the African 
countries has shifted from strong support during the establishment of the ICC to calls 
of non-cooperation combined with strong allegations that the ICC is targeting 
African countries and the African race exclusively. Because of these developments 
the future of the ICC in Africa and even in general seems now reached crossroads.  
 
This work looks exclusively at future-oriented elements of the purposes of criminal 
punishment. It examines in particular the impact of the ICC on human rights, 
especially on the African continent. The main problem in this context is, to define 
clearly such a possible positive impact on the human right situation and to establish 
proof of it. In the absence of a proof of such a positive impact in the past, the present 
or the foreseeable future, the justifying of the ICC from an African perspective or in 
general is in question. To address these main questions, the following sub-questions 
are asked.  
Firstly, the general questions about the justification of international criminal law 
could arise at least in two ways.  On the one hand, it could be asked whether 
international criminal punishment can generally be justified if it has no proven 
impact on preventing crimes or massive human rights violations in future. This 
seems to be a reasonable question, because most modern systems of criminal 
punishment require, despite the more backwards-looking elements such as retribution 
or achieving justice, at least an additional impact on the future. Beyond that, even if 
we assume that such a positive impact on human rights is generally not mandatory 
for justifying the work of the ICC, for instance with the argument that the state 
parties transferred their sovereign right to punish to an international institution and 
that the Rome Statute does not require a cumulative achievement of all grounding 
purposes, one must  still consider those cases where the ICC has no treaty-based 
jurisdiction but rather a jurisdiction because of a referral of the United Nations 
Security Council (UN Security Council). These cases, for instance, lack a transfer of 
3	  
	  
the right to punishment from a sovereign state to an international tribunal and the 
jurisdiction of the ICC becomes established only because of the unilateral act of the 
UN Security Council. According to Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations 
(UN Charter) the UN Security Council can undertake measures to ‘maintain or 
restore international peace and security’, which includes the possibility to refer a 
situation to the ICC, even if the Court has no treaty-based jurisdiction. This act of 
referral constitutes the jurisdiction of the ICC, Article 13 (b) Rome Statute. In 
assuming that the criminal punishment by the ICC has no impact in preventing future 
human rights violations, it must be asked: Can a referral by the UN Security Council 
to the ICC be justified to ‘maintain or restore international peace and security’? 
Secondly, a lack of empirical data (statistics and researches) with regard to the main 
question, the ability of the ICC to prevent future human rights violations, could cause 
another problem. It must be taken into account that the ICC, like international 
criminal law itself, is a relatively new instrument in the human rights protection 
system. The Court had to be installed completely new and its jurisdiction concerns 
very complex, sometimes on-going situations in different cultural environments 
around the world, which often lead to difficulties in finding reliable facts. 
Additionally, sometimes strong political influences occur and just practical problems 
arise such as in the area of co-operation of state parties with the Court. Because of 
these problems, which arise regularly at an early stage of a new international 
institution, it can be assumed that there are currently barely empirical data, such as 
reliable case statistics or case researches, which could prove a positive influence of 
the ICC on human rights.  Therefore a different approach in answering the main 
question is needed. At first it must be considered the general accepted rules, 
principles and experiences in the context of purposes and effects of national criminal 
penalty systems. Because of assured empirical facts, such a positive future-orientated 
impact can generally be assumed in national criminal justice systems even the 
effectiveness of the certain crime-preventing effects in practice is still controversial. 
However, from this starting point on it has to be asked, whether these principles are 
applicable to and useful in international criminal jurisdiction to prove the ability of 
the ICC to combat future human rights violations. At first glance, this may appear 
obvious and during the establishment of the ICC no official of the UN or of the 
involved parties left any doubt in this matter. However, it must be mentioned that an 
international criminal justice system is not mandatory identical with a national 
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criminal justice regime and that there are instead vast differences. These differences 
can mainly be found in the types of the relevant crimes, the numbers of affected 
persons, in the fact that national governments transfer their very own right to 
criminal punishment to an international institution and that the ICC strongly depends 
from a support of the state parties to enforce the decisions of the Court. These points 
indicate that the doctrines and experiences regarding national purposes of 
punishment of criminals can be the point of departure, but that a simply transferal to 
the international criminal law (ICL) is not self-evident.  
Thirdly, one must also consider the opposite side in criminal procedure and 
especially, the impact of the Court on the human rights of accused persons, such as 
the right to equality or the right to fair trial, which are protected in most international 
or regional human rights treaties. This argument rarely receives the high attention it 
deserves, but it has to be taken into account that this question is directly linked to the 
effectiveness of the common purposes of criminal punishment. Deterrence or 
educative effects are also mainly based on the acceptance of such trials or 
convictions by the affected people. Therefore, it must be asked whether these effects 
can occur, if the most affected people or communities reject the work of the ICC. For 
example, at the AU summit 2013, the whole continent unanimously rejected 
decisions of the Court and called the outcome as biased and unfair. In such a 
situation, the aimed future-looking effects then could turn in the opposite.  
Fourthly, the issue arises whether there must or at least could be an exception in the 
prosecution of international crimes in the context of Africa. Even if we take for 
granted that fundamental human rights shall be protected equally in all countries 
around the world and because of this the human rights must be protected through the 
enforcement of criminal law in Africa at the same level like everywhere else in the 
world, it should not be questionable that the situation in Africa in many points is 
quite different from other parts of the world. These differences spans across history, 
the actual political and economic situation, the different cultural background, the 
dimensions of human rights violations and different historical methods of 
(alternative) conflict resolution. The legal framework of the Rome Statute includes, 
for instance in Articles 16 or 53 of the Rome Statute, possible exception clauses. It 
must be determined how far the scope of these clauses can extend and whether such 
clauses can be used to consider a special African situation. 
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Lastly, it must be asked, whether the work of the ICC can even become 
counterproductive in preventing further human rights violations in particular 
situations. These cases concern above all on-going conflicts, where the ICC is 
prosecuting persons or issued arrest warrants and in doing so may hinder a near-term 
political solution of the conflict. This point, usually discussed under the topic ‘peace 
v. justice’ can lead to a nearly intractable conflict between the different goals of the 
ICC, namely between the goals of achieving justice and ending impunity on the one 
side and the goals to help ending conflicts and prevent future human rights violation 
on the other side. It must be asked, whether the possibility of preventing the worst 
human rights violations can outweigh the purpose of ending impunity. 
 
The aim of this study is twofold, each with a special consideration of the African 
situation and African cases.  
Firstly, the study wants to answer the general question on the impact of the ICC on 
human rights. For this it will be resorted at first, to experiences and doctrines 
concerning the ‘crime preventing effects’ in national criminal law. In this context, 
the prior knowledge of the inherent differences between national and international 
criminal law will require that further clarification be made whether the national 
experiences can be transferred to international level or not. Additionally, it will be 
looked for evidences or, at least, indications of such a positive impact taking regard 
of experiences with international criminal procedures in the past. In both approaches, 
scientific search for substantial proofs will be undertaken. 
Secondly, in taking the relevant shortcomings of ICC into account, the study will 
determine how these problems in context of human rights protection could be 
handled and determine possibilities to end the opposition of African countries against 
the ICC. Will it be possible to find solutions or ways which can increase the ICC’s 
impact on human rights and which are feasible in the sense that implementation 
through the Court, the prosecutor of the ICC (the Prosecutor), the state parties or the 




The significance of the main question regarding the impact of the ICC in preventing 
future human rights violations lies in a typical principle (phenomenon) in 
international law: most international rules are treaty based. The norm is that these 
principles are obligatory for states that have signed and ratified the treaty. Unlike in 
the national level, there is no single ‘authority’ capable of establishing such unilateral 
rules. Therefore, the more problematic points can be found in such a treaty concept 
the easier it becomes for states to argue against joining such an international 
agreement, withdraw from, or even to reject to fulfil its obligation under a treaty in 
practice - possibly because of self-interested reasons and under massive public, 
diplomatic or international pressure. In the case of the ICC, the problem becomes 
relevant in an additional context. Unlike traditional or national criminal courts, the 
ICC does not have its own execution-organs, so that even on the outset of an 
investigation or a prosecution, it depends on the contribution of the affected states. 
The more critical points the actors can invoke the more the effectiveness of the work 
of the ICC can be decreased. If it is possible to show with this study that the 
mentioned problems do not really exist, it would become more difficult for non-state-
parties to refuse signing and ratifying the Rome Statute or for state-parties to refuse 
cooperation with the ICC in particular situations. In this way, the effectiveness of the 
ICC in preventing human rights violation could be strengthened.  
 
As was already mentioned above, a resort to empirical evidence as a method of 
research in answering our main question is not possible - at least not in a direct 
manner. In this context, it should be borne in mind that the ICC came into force a 
little bit more than a decade ago. It should be noted that the jurisdiction of the Court 
concerns crimes or situations which are much more complex than common national 
criminal law matters. Additionally, there exist general implementation problems in 
the early days of such an international institution and visible (future-oriented) effects 
regularly occur with time delay. There are some empirical data concerning the work 
of the Court till date, such as the number of cases prosecuted by the ICC, the 
geographical background of the prosecuted persons, the small number of convictions 
and the enormous costs of the Court. These points were often cited as an argument 
against the Court, but can generally give no indication concerning the ability of the 
ICC in preventing human rights violations in the future. Additionally, a resort to only 
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certain individual cases or examples of the work of the ICC seems critically. The 
numbers of occurred examples is far too small and other causes for the certain 
outcome cannot be excluded. Therefore, it seems not possible to deduce generally 
binding rules or policies in referring only to one or a very few number of cases. 
Furthermore, it seems generally questionable, whether reliable data will become 
available in the foreseeable future. As a consequence of the scope of the Rome 
Statute, only a very limited number of - de facto occurred - cases will become before 
the ICC. These is according to that which the Court shall have jurisdiction only in a 
limited number of cases, namely cases of the worst perpetrators (Article 17 (1) (d) 
Rome Statute) and only if the national justice system is not able or willing to trial 
them (Article 17 (1) (a) Rome Statute). Reliable empirical evidences, such as 
statistical data or case studies, regarding the question of how the Court deters 
possible perpetrators can therefore not be expected in the foreseeable future. 
Similarly, also a solely resort to certain empirical experiences from former 
international criminal courts seems in general critical. Also these courts judged only 
about a fractional part of the de-facto occurred international crimes in past and were 
additionally established after the time when the prosecuted crimes were committed. 
However, empirical data together with other sources can possibly be used in an 
indirect way to answer this main question. Firstly, we have to assume such a ‘crime 
preventing effect’ in the national criminal law. This supposition is based on the 
evidence of data and doctrines available for the national criminal law. Such a general 
impact cannot be debunked, even if the effectiveness of the different ‘crime 
preventing effects’ is still controversial. Secondly, it must be determined the main 
differences between the national and international level. Lastly, it must be clarified 
whether these determined differences can exclude a transfer of the empirical data and 
doctrines from the national to the international level or whether they are applicable 
also in ICL and in the system of the Rome Statute. 
To address these questions, a number of varying sources are considered. The sources 
include: statutes, doctrines about crime preventing effects in national criminal law, 
documents of international organizations (UN), case law concerning international 
criminal law, papers or opinions of Non-Governmental-Organizations (NGO) and, 
last but not least, documents or expressed opinions of African countries or their 
organizations themselves. Two general types of sources have to be distinguished: 
primary and secondary sources. Firstly, particular attention should be paid to the 
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primary sources, namely the Rome Statute as the main source for the ICC itself and 
documents concerning the Rome Statute, as far as they reflect a homogeneous 
opinion of the state parties (for instance the Kampala Declaration). Whether we can 
qualify case law of international criminal courts as such a primary source depends on 
whether we answer this question from a civil or a common law system perspective. 
However, ultimately it needs no clear decision. Even a position of an international 
criminal court should only be taken for granted if the court is delivering plausible 
arguments for its view. Secondly, if a relevant question cannot be answered by 
reference to these sources or at least not clearly, a resort to secondary sources, such 
as doctrines, sentiments of scholars, opinion or documents of NGO’s and documents 
or statements of state parties and their politicians can be helpful. Because of the vast 
number of such documents, it seems important to concentrate on sources which can 
deliver clear, logical and coherent arguments in answering our question. 
Additionally, it is important to keep an eye on the background of the author and 
possible personal interest of him or her. However, because of the already mentioned 
and necessary participation of the affected states, organisations and individuals, even 
opinions or actions without any legally based arguments can become relevant in 
practice, above all, if they will be used by whole regional organizations like the AU. 
Because of this and the fact that this work is concentrating on the African situation, 
the resolutions of the AU and related documents or statements are of special 
importance for this work.  
 
The thesis will be structured as follows, with a special focus on African or Africa-
relevant cases. The first Chapter looks at the national level of criminal law. It 
illustrates the general or common future-oriented purposes for criminal punishment 
in national criminal law systems. Subsequently, Chapter II will determine the main 
relevant differences between the national criminal law and the ICL. It will be 
concentrated to these differences, which can become a direct relevance for the 
transferability of the national ‘crime preventing effects’ to the international level. 
Chapter III seeks an answer to the question, whether these showed differences 
generally exclude a transfer of the crime-preventing effects from the national level to 
the international level of criminal law. Subsequently, Chapter IV addresses special 
situations that occurred particularly in Africa, which can have additional influence on 
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the crime preventing effects of the ICC. This concerns in particular the ‘peace v. 
justice’ discussion, questions of equality in prosecution, the rights of the accused 
persons, and question whether regional circumstances can be considered under the 
Rome Statute.   Finally, some recommendations to improve the positive influence of 







Common Crime Preventing Effects in National Criminal Law  
1. Introduction 
The aim of this Chapter is to give a brief overview of crime preventing effects in 
national criminal law, their interaction among themselves, and failures in certain 
situations. The ICL and particularly the Rome Statute are relatively new instruments, 
the number of relevant cases that have been investigated and prosecuted is small and 
credible evidence (statistics or researches) that can be used to answer the question 
whether the ICC can prevent future human rights violation, remains scant. A 
reference to a very limited number of certain cases can from the outset delivers no 
proof for or excludes such an ability of the ICC.2 As opposed to the ICL, the national 
criminal law has been in existence for a longer time and it has been used daily 
around the world. Therefore, in national criminal law a resort to much more 
empirical sources, concerning the influence of criminal law in preventing crimes in 
future, is possible. At the national level a large number of statistical researches exist, 
a large number of scholars developed comprehensive doctrines during the last 
centuries and even national court decisions have dealt with these problems.3  So, if 
sufficient proofs for crime preventing effects in national criminal law can be 
established and the relevant differences between the national criminal law and the 
ILC not cogent exclude an application of these effects in ICL,4 the ability of the ICC 
in preventing international crimes (or human rights violations) will be difficult to 
refute. 
In national criminal law, a large number (‘a broad thrust’)5 of different theories 
exist, which try to explain the reasons and purposes of criminal punishment, its 
effects, or its justification in general.6 As a rule, these different theories can be 
classified into retributive theories (expiation / vengeance / denunciation), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  	   This	  problem	  will	  be	  discussed	  more	  deeply	  within	  Chapter	  III.	  Proponents	  as	  well	  as	  opponents	  
of	  a	  crime	  preventing	  ability	  of	  the	  ICC	  can	  refer	  only	  to	  a	  very	  limited	  number	  of	  cases	  to	  support	  
their	   opinion.	   Fletcher,	   Basic	   Concepts	   of	   Criminal	   Law,	   p.	   31	   hold	   the	   view	   that	   it	   is	   ‘nearly	  
impossible’	  to	  proof	  a	  crime	  reducing	  ability	  of	  criminal	  law	  in	  a	  particular	  case.	  
3	  	   Jacobs,	  pp.	  15	  ff.;	  Lauterwein,	  pp.	  5	  ff.;	  Walker	  /	  Padfield,	  pp.	  79	  ff.	  	  
4	  	   This	  will	  be	  discusses	  in	  Chapter	  II	  /	  Chapter	  III.	  	  
5	  	  	   Wilson,	  p.	  54.	  




utilitarianism theories (concerning the consequences of punishment such as 
deterrence or education) or mixed theories, which combine parts or elements of the 
two categories.7 When simplified, it must be said that all of these, at least if seen 
individually, can be criticized in some ways and, especially, because of the fact that 
they can fail in cases with exceptional circumstances.8 This work will only consider 
the ‘future-looking’ or ‘crime-preventing’ effects9 of criminal punishment to find an 
answer to the main question, whether the ICC can help to prevent future human 
rights violations. Within this framework, several generally10 accepted utilitarianism 
effects in national criminal law can be found. 
2. General and Individual Deterrence 
One of the most popular utilitarian effects of punishment is deterrence, which can be 
subdivided into individual and general deterrence.11 The individual perpetrator, who 
was sanctioned under criminal law, shall not commit the same crime once again 
(individual deterrence).12 Other persons shall be deterred to commit a similar crime 
because of their knowledge that a perpetrator was punished and they have to expect 
similar consequences under criminal law (general deterrence).13 The main or general 
reason behind these two concepts is, the general expectation that individuals weighs 
possible advantages resulting from the intended criminal act with the possible 
disadvantages of a possible conviction under criminal law for the committed crime.14 
A lot of arguments are being used against these approaches. One of the central 
arguments against both deterrence concepts is that deterrence cannot work from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  	   See	  Wilson,	  pp.	  46	  ff.	  
8	  	   The	  recognition	  that	  the	  strict	  retributive	  as	  well	  as	  the	  strict	  utilitarian	  theories	  have	  limitations,	  
led	   to	   the	  development	  of	   the	  mixed	   theories.	  But	  even	   these	  mixed	   theories	   can	  be	  criticized	  
widely.	  See	  Wilson,	  pp.	  57	  f.	  	  
9	  	   There	   are	   used	   different	   terms	   in	   literature:	   Cryer/Friman/Robinson/Wilmshurst,	   p.	   23	   are	  
speaking	   about	   teleological	   purposes	   or	  Clarkson/Keating,	   p.	   26	   are	   speaking	   about	   utilitarian	  
theories.	   Within	   this	   work	   the	   terms	   of	   utilitarian	   theories	   or	   utilitarianism	   effects	   will	   be	  
preferred.	  
10	  	   The	  used	   term	   ‘generally	   accepted’	  must	  be	  understand	   strictly	   in	   the	  way	   that	  every	  of	   these	  
individual	   effects	   can	   have	   a	   justification,	   (at	   least)	   in	   certain	   situations.	   There	   are	   still	   strong	  
critics	  concerning	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  individual	  deterrence	  effects.	  
11	  	   Wilson,	  p.	  54.	  	  
12	  	   Wilson,	  ibid.	  
13	  	   Wilson,	  ibid.	  
14	  	   Feuerbach,	  pp.	   44	   f.	   Even	   this	   general	   approach	   of	   a	  homo	   oeconomicus	   was	  widely	   criticised	  
because	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   perpetrators	   not	   always	   weight	   their	   behaviour	   with	   possible	  
consequences	   of	   their	   conduct	   and	   that	   they	   instead	   often	   act	   spontaneously,	   it	   should	   not	  
questionable	  that	  there	  are	  cases	  or	  individuals	  where	  this	  point	  has	  a	  crime	  preventing	  effect.	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outset, if the perpetrator in question fails to weight the potential advantages of the 
crime against the possible disadvantages of the crime because of autonomous 
reasons.15 Individuals may be influenced by actin in the heat of the moment, by 
acting under the influence of alcohol or drugs or while they are in other temporary 
states of mind (rages, anger).16 A statistically proved high reconviction rate of 
sentenced perpetrators will often be used as an additional argument against 
effectiveness of a special deterrence.17  A further point of critic has its origin in 
‘technical problems’ of the most available crime statistics.18 Even if empirical studies 
about a recidivism rate of convicted criminals exist, it seems difficult to determine, 
whether a deterrence effect or autonomous reasons in the person of the perpetrator 
have prevented recidivism.19 As a further problem in this context it must be taken 
into account that a new crime committed by this person was just not detected.20 Even 
if these critical points have generally their justification, there is doubtlessly an 
influence in the way that ‘some potential offenders are discouraged from some types 
of offence by the threat of legal consequences’.21  
3. Educative Deterrence 
The concept of ‘educative deterrence’ rest upon the expectation ‘that public morality 
and inhabitation against committing crimes are created and/or preserved by the 
regular punishment of others’.22 The regular application of criminal law can remind 
the society of relevant valid norms.23 A lack of prosecution becomes relevant in the 
context of the education of the public, but also linked directly to the general 
efficiency of the about mentioned deterrence effects.24 Similar to the two previously 
discussed deterrence concepts, the ‘educative deterrence’ faces the same problems 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  	   Clarkson/Keating,	  p.	  35.	  
16	  	   Robinson	  /	  Darlay,	  pp.	  179	  ff.	  
17	  	   Clarkson/Keating,	  p.	  35.	  
18	  	   Walker	  /	  Padfield,	  p.	  83.	  
19	  	   Walker	  /	  Padfield,	  ibid.	  
20	  	   Walker	  /	  Padfield,	  ibid.	  
21	  	  	  Walker	  /	  Padfield,	  p.	  97	  ff.	  refer	  to	  several	  ‘obvious’	  cases	  in	  the	  past.	  
22	  	   Clarkson/Keating,	  p.	  43.	  	  
23	  	   Wilson,	   p.	   54.	   Clarkson/Keating,	   p.	   39	   argue	   that	   ‘Punishment	   of	   criminals	   builds	   up	   in	   the	  
community	   over	   a	   period	   of	   time	   the	   habit	   of	   not	   breaking	   the	   law.	   It	   creates	   unconscious	  
inhibitions	   against	   committing	   crimes	   and	   thus	   serves	   to	   educate	   the	   public	   as	   to	   the	   proper	  
distinction	  between	  good	  and	  bad	  conduct’.	  
24	  	   A	   lack	   of	   criminal	   prosecution	   has	   doubtlessly	   a	   strong	   influence	   to	   the	   perpetrators	  
consideration	  between	   the	  possible	   advantages	   and	  disadvantages	   of	   committing	   a	   crime.	   The	  
lower	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  prosecution	  is	  the	  lower	  special	  or	  general	  deterrence	  effects	  are.	  	  
13	  
	  
and critics. Where the individual perpetrator does not weight between advantages 
and disadvantages of the intended crime, ‘educative deterrence’ falls to irrelevance.25 
Additionally, the already mentioned ‘technical problems’ in research exists.26 On the 
other hand ‘experimental evidences, which strongly suggest’ that such a crime 
preventing effect exists, can be found ‘at least in the case of some types of conduct 
and some types of people’.27 In this context, several cases were mentioned. Firstly, a 
very pictorial example in Great Britain was described, in referring to the situation of 
not permitted private usage of company phones by employees.28 Such a phone usage 
without permission of the employer constitutes a formal and serious criminal offence 
under British criminal law. However, the lack of criminal prosecution in practice had 
led to a lack in public morality in the sense that people have not been educated in 
accepting the gravity of this criminal offence.29 Secondly, reference was made to the 
situation within the military as the ‘clearest example’, where the purely regular 
inculcation of the relevant rules and discipline leads to a ‘purely automatic, habitual 
response’ and to a following of the rules.30 Lastly, it was referred to experiences in 
Great Britain in relation with drinking and driving. There is now a substantially 
wider moral disapproval of such behaviour than it was shortly after drinking and 
driving became a criminal offence.31 Even some critical arguments exist, the general 
potential of this concept in preventing future crimes, at least in cases of some 
potential offenders, can be not denied.  
4. Rehabilitation 
The aspect to reform or rehabilitate the individual offender is arguably a further 
important utilitarianism effect.32 The idea behind this ‘rehabilitative ideal’33 is to 
improve the character of the individual person and because of this further offences 
should be avoided, even if the person in question could still commit the crime 
without the fear of a penalty.34 In contrast to the fear-based deterrence effects, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  	   Clarkson/Keating,	  p.	  43.	  
26	  	   Walker/Padfield,	  pp.	  103	  f.	  	  
27	  	   Walker/Padfield,	  ibid.	  	  
28	  	   Clarkson/Keating,	  p.	  39.	  	  
29	  	   Ibid.	  
30	  	   Andenaes,	  p.	  179.	  	  
31	  	   Bottoms,	  Morality,	  p.	  25.	  
32	  	   Wilson,	  p.	  54.	  
33	  	   Bottoms,	  The	  Coming	  Crisis,	  p.	  1.	  
34	  	   Walker,	  p.	  393.	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goal of preventing future crimes shall be reached here by a positive motivation of the 
individual.35 The efficiency of this (relatively new)36 approach was widely criticised. 
These critics were based mainly on the fact that researches have showed ‘with a few 
and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have 
had no appreciable effect on recidivism’.37 On the other hand, it can be argued that 
there were researches concentrating on treatment strategies and concerning specific 
categories of offenders, which revealed a positive influence of such measures.38 In 
answering the question whether the rehabilitation or reformation approach can 
prevent future crimes, three points are of a special importance. Firstly, even the most 
ardent critics of this approach do not completely deny such an influence. Instead, 
they recognize that there are ‘a few and isolated exceptions’.39 Secondly, it must be 
taken into account that the efficiency of this approach in national criminal law 
systems depends mainly from the particular penal system itself, above all from the 
additional (non-penal) undertaken measures. Even today the most national criminal 
law systems favour other goals of criminal punishment, such as deterrence or 
incapacitation, or they lack just of (non-penal) recourses in their common prison 
systems to support the rehabilitation approach. Lastly, similar to other considered 
utilitarianism effects, the success of this approach depends largely on certain 
circumstances and in particular, on the individual perpetrator.40 If a certain individual 
is unwilling to change attitude and behaviour, such efforts are condemned to failure 
from the beginning. It is not questionable that the rehabilitation concept fails in 
special situations, like all the other utilitarian approaches. However, it seems not 
possible to argue that within the rehabilitation approach ‘nothing works’,41 without a 
consideration of obvious actual shortcomings of rehabilitation recourses in common 
prison systems or the unwillingness of some criminals. In considering a ‘willing’ 
perpetrator together with the supposition that sufficient rehabilitation sources will be 
provided by a sentencing system, a positive influence of the rehabilitation approach 
in preventing future crimes is plausible.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  	   Clarkson/Keating,	  p.	  48.	  
36	  	   See	  for	  a	  short	  historical	  overview	  Clarkson/Keating,	  pp.	  48	  f.	  	  
37	  	   Martinson,	  What	  Works?	  (1974);	  Bottoms,	  The	  coming	  crisis,	  p.	  1,	  speaks	  about	  ‘the	  collapse	  of	  
the	  rehabilitative	  ideal’.	  
38	  	   Clarkson/Keating,	  p.	  51.	  
39	  	   Martinson,	  What	  Works?	  (1974).	  
40	  	   Clarkson/Keating,	  Criminal	  Law,	  pp.	  50	  f.	  
41	  	   See	   Clarkson/Keating,	   p.	   51	   in	   reference	   to	   the	   question	   ‘What	   works?’	   asked	   by	   Martinson,	  




The incapacitation effect must be mentioned as a further important utilitarian 
effect.42 Simplified, it could be said that this is or at least should be the ‘ultimate’ 
tool to prevent future crimes, at least in consideration of the jailed individual 
offender. A convicted criminal, who is being incapacitated, is normally unable to 
commit further crimes during the time of his incapacitation. On the other hand, cases 
in history have shown that even this approach is subject to failure in special 
situations. Especially, in situations where the convicted and incapacitated offender 
can resort to a criminal structure and is still able to communicate with it, further 
crimes can be committed by him or her.43 Notwithstanding that, the general ability of 
this approach in preventing future crimes is not questionable and there wasn’t argued 
serious critic about the general effectiveness of this crime preventing effect. 
6. Restorative Justice and Condemnation 
Finally, it must be considered two utilitarianism effects, which become usually more 
relevant in the field of ICL. However, elements of restorative justice and 
condemnation can be found also within the national criminal law.44 Apart from the 
goal of providing compensation to the victim by the offender, conflict resolution is a 
second main goal within the restorative justice concept.45 In light of this 
understanding, further criminal behaviour can be prevented.46 The concept of 
condemnation is based on the expectation that punishment can be a form of ‘moral 
communication’ that express condemnation, and as a result, strengthen social 
solidarity to prevent future crimes.47 Further, the punishment’s true function is 
maintaining social cohesion and consequently, preventing future crimes.48 This 
approach shares similarity with the utilitarian approach of ‘educative deterrence’ and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  	   Clarkson/Keating,	  p.	  43.	  	  
43	  	   In	   the	  seventies	  and	  eighties	  of	   the	   last	  century	   the	  main	   leaders	  of	   the	   terror	  group	  RAF	   (Red	  
Army	  Fraction)	  were	   incapacitated	   in	  Germany.	  Even	   in	  this	  case	  the	  highest	  security	  standards	  
were	  applied,	  they	  were	  still	  able	  to	  plan	  and	  order	  further	  terror	  acts	  like	  murders,	  bomb	  attacks	  
or	  kidnappings.	  
44	  	   Schaack/Slye,	  pp.	  16	  ff.;	  For	  instance	  §	  46a	  StGB	  explicitly	  recognized	  restorative	  elements	  within	  
the	   German	   criminal	   law.	   Furthermore,	   according	   §	   169	   GVG	   court	   trials	   in	   Germany	   are	  
principally	  publicly	  (condemnation).	  
45	  	   Schaack/Slye,	  p.	  16.	  
46	  	   Schaack/Slye,	  ibid.	  
47	  	   Schaack/Slye,	  p.	  17.	  	  
48	  	   For	  further	  information	  about	  this	  approach	  see:	  Cotterrell,	  pp.	  74	  f.	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the retributive theory of ‘denunciation’. In all three approaches the punishment has a 
symbolic or expressive function.49 One example can be found in the ‘shaming 
penalties’ which were widely used in history and even today, in places like the USA. 
In these cases, beside the retributive punishment through denunciation, the symbolic 
or expressive communication function is being to the fore. Additionally, reference is 
made to a popular possibility in practice within the German criminal law system. 
According § 153a StPO, the prosecutor or the court can under certain circumstances 
– even in the case of a doubtlessly committed crime – stop the prosecution and 
instead impose certain ‘conditions’ on the perpetrator. Such a common ‘condition’ is 
for instance that the criminal has to pay only money for a certain charitable project or 
to a NGO. Even in these cases the payable amount of money is usually crucial higher 
than an expected fine in a common criminal trial, the majority of perpetrators make 
use of this opportunity. The most probable reason for this seems to be that the 
perpetrator would like to avoid a public procedure and a public condemnation or just 
the ‘moral communication’. 
7. Conclusion 
In conclusion it can be said that several utilitarian effects in national criminal law systems 
can be found, even when they have shortcomings. All of them can fail in specific situations. 
Their particular intensity were and is always controversially and depends from a lot of 
particular circumstances in the special case, such as from the kind of crime, from the 
individual perpetrator, the general effectiveness of the prosecution and the particular 
sentencing system. However, three points are of a special importance and worthy to be 
mentioned explicitly: Firstly, it seems incorrect to consider only certain utilitarianism effects 
individually. Each one of these effects tends to fail under certain conditions. Therefore, all 
utilitarianism effects must be considered as a whole system with an interaction between the 
individual utilitarian effects. It is important to note that where one particular approach falls 
short of expectation under special conditions, another approach is likely to perform better 
and more effectively in preventing future crimes. Secondly, criminal law is not the sole or 
ultimate way in preventing future crimes. Other provisions, such as education or social 
development, are also important to reduce crimes in future.50 The criminal law can be only 
an important pillar to achieve this goal. Lastly, it would be impetuous to think that criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  	   Clarkson/Keating,	  pp.	  50	  f.	  argue	   in	  this	  way	  for	   the	  retributive	  theory	  of	  denunciation	  and	  the	  
utilitarian	  theory	  of	  educative	  deterrence.	  
50	  	  	  Attorney	  General	  Justice	  (Australia),	  Crime	  Prevention	  through	  Social	  Development.	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law together with all the other provisions like education and social development could 
prevent crimes in the future completely. It is important to state that special circumstances 






Differences between the National and the International Criminal 
Justice  
1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to determine important differences between national criminal law 
systems and the ICL. In evaluating the ability of the ICC to prevent future human 
rights violations, these differences must be sifted out, which can be of a direct 
relevance to the question, whether the common (national) utilitarian theories of 
punishment are applicable in ICL and in particular within the system of the Rome 
Statute. Several such relevant distinctions between the two levels of criminal law 
exist, in both the normative and the practical sphere. 
2. The Different Nature of Relevant Crimes 
One of the main differences between the national criminal law and the ICL can be 
described under the broader term ‘different nature of relevant crimes’ in the two 
different levels. For the ICL level, Herbert Jäger shaped the term of ‘macro crimes’ 
(“Makrokriminalität”), which are characterized as products of an exceptional, 
serious and dangerous collective violence.51 Other authors try to describe these 
crimes as crimes strengthened by states52 or crimes organized by states,53 but such 
definitions seems to narrow.54 In contrast to the ICL, relevant crimes in national 
criminal law are not limited to cases of serious and dangerous collective violence. It 
is within the broader term of different ‘nature of relevant crimes’ that the following 
differences have a particular importance. 
Firstly, a strong limitation that concerns the subject matter jurisdiction (ratione 
materiae) is established in the concept of the Rome Statute. According to Article 5 
(1) of the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC ‘shall be limited to the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  	   Jäger,	   p.	   11.	   The	   term	   ‘macro	   crimes’	   is	   not	   to	   be	   confused	  with	   the	   term	  macro	   criminology;	  
latter	  one	  is	  more	  a	  concept	  to	  explain	  the	  behaviour	  of	  perpetrators	  with	  their	  relationships	  to	  
the	  direct	  environment.	  
52	  	   Naucke,	  p.	  1.	  
53	  	   Neubacher,	  pp.	  29	  f.	  	  
54	  	   If	  one	   takes	   cases	   into	  account,	  where	   for	   instance	   rebel	   groups	   fight	  against	  a	   state	   structure	  
and	   commit	   international	   crimes,	   there	   is	   clearly	   no	   state	   strengthened	   or	   state	   organized	  
behaviour	  or	  conduct.	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serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole’. These crimes 
of concern are; the crime of genocide (Article 6 Rome Statute), crimes against 
humanity (Article 7 Rome Statute), war crimes (Article 8 Rome Statute), and the 
crime of aggression (Article 5 (1) (d) Rome Statute).55 The ‘common’ crimes found 
under national criminal law normally punishably, are from the outset not an object of 
the Rome Statute. Furthermore, according to Article 17 (1) (d) of the Rome Statute 
cases, which lack	   of ‘sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court’, are 
inadmissible before the ICC. This provision known as the ‘gravity threshold’ 
determines a further limitation in this context, that even in situations where anyone 
of the four core crimes was committed, only cases of the mainly responsible persons 
and cases with the worst dimensions are admissibly before the Court.56 This appears 
as a particularly, important difference. Although, the national criminal law systems 
permit or require a distinction between the individual contribution to a certain crime, 
a generally and completely removable from culpability, or at least, from the 
jurisdiction of a certain court is normally not thinkable in national criminal law 
systems. 
Another important difference relates to the number of potential victims on one side 
and the number of perpetrators on other side. Large numbers of perpetrators and 
victims are the rule in ICL. This can be lead to a situation, where nearly all members 
of a population group can become victims (for instance in the case of genocide) or 
where nearly all members of a population group can become perpetrators (for 
instance in the case of apartheid as a crime against humanity under the Rome 
Statute). In 1994, genocide occurred in Rwanda. A specific group of the Rwandan 
population called the ‘Hutu’s’, between April and July of 1994, slaughtered between 
500.000 and 1.000.000 members of another group of Rwandan population known as 
the ‘Tutsi’s’.57 This number correlated to about 75 percent of whole Tutsi population 
group.58 A similar occurrence took place during the World War II in Germany, where 
nearly the whole Jewish population in Germany was killed or expelled by the 
German Nazi regime. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  	   An	  exercise	  of	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  crime	  of	  aggression	  is	  at	  least	  actually	  not	  possible,	  see	  Article	  
5	  (2)	  Rome	  Statute.	  	  	  
56	  	   Schabas,	  	  p.	  86.	  
57	  	   Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (Rwanda),	  Leave	  None	  to	  Tell	  the	  Story:	  Genocide	  in	  Rwanda,	  Introduction.	  




Thirdly, pure practical problems arise in ICL, which are not known in national 
criminal law. On both sides (perpetrators and victims) a large number of persons are 
usually involved. The conflict situations occur normally in large and rural areas, 
which were often still controlled by one of the conflict parties. This complexity 
makes it impossible to regularly consider all documentations and/or hear all 
witnesses. As a result, it is necessary to regularly consult with secondary sources: 
reports from NGOs, written statements of witnesses, and documents from local 
governments. It is also important to note that the borderlines that separate the armed 
soldier and the terrorists or the police officers and the criminal are blurred.59 
Additionally, the Prosecutor and the ICC are often left with no alternative than to 
depend on the local investigating authorities or the actual government support. If the 
actual local administration refuses a support, it becomes difficult to solve the 
situation solidly. A case in point is the trial of the current Kenyan President 
Kenyatta. The Prosecutor of Mr. Kenyatta’s case recently requested that the ICC 
delay the proceeding because the key witnesses are either renegading on their 
willingness to testify or rescinding the validity of their initial testimonies.60 The 
Prosecutor cannot force the one witness to testify and he cannot really check because 
of which reasons the other witness changed his testify. Such within international 
crimes ‘normal’ difficulties, are within the national criminal law – at least usually – 
exceptional. Because of these additional problems, in ICL the pure practical solution 
of the occurred situations is usually much more difficult than in national criminal law 
cases.61   
3. Relationship between the Perpetrator and its Environment  
Another distinction when comparing both levels of criminal law lies in the 
relationship between the perpetrator and his (direct) environment. Unlike the 
situation at the level of the national criminal law, where the conduct of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  	   Nouwen	  /	  Werner,	  962.	  
60	  	   Karimi,	  ICC	  prosecutor:	  Evidence	  insufficient	  to	  try	  Kenyan	  President	  Uhuru	  Kenyatta.	  
61	  	   Such	  practical	  problems	  in	  solving	  a	  situation	  of	  an	  international	  conflict	  always	  arise	  and	  are	  not	  
limited	  to	  the	  work	  of	  an	  international	  criminal	  court.	  Also	  other	  international	  organisations	  are	  
facing	  the	  same	  problems.	  In	  this	  context,	  it	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  the	  invasion	  in	  Iraq	  in	  2003	  or	  to	  
the	  actual	   conflict	   in	   Syria.	   In	   the	   first	   case	  only	   after	   the	   invasions	  of	   allied	   troops,	   it	   became	  
clear	  that	  the	  ‘clear	  proofs’	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destructions	  were	  completely	  
wrong.	  Much	  more	   complicated	   seems	   the	   situation	   in	   Syria.	   Even	   it	   seems	   clear	   that	   recently	  
chemical	  weapons	  were	  used	   in	   the	   conflict,	   there	   is	   absolutely	  no	  proof	  which	  of	   the	   conflict	  
parties	  is	  accountable	  for	  the	  use	  of	  these	  weapons.	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perpetrator is regularly unaccepted by the community, at the level of the ICL the 
reverse is the case.62 The particular perpetrator is not forced to commit the crime in 
secrecy. Instead in case of ICL an individual perpetrator is normally supported 
forthright by its direct environment. For instance, it will appear impossible, for 
anyone person to commit massacre, if such person’s direct environment classifies 
such mass murder as serious crime that is banned. In such a case, the environment 
would normally intervene and halt such ongoing criminal activities. For such serious 
widespread and ongoing (international) crimes to succeed, it may only require the 
support or at the least, the acceptance of the environment. Insofar it can be referred 
once again to the genocide situation in Rwanda in 1994. This was described as 
‘popular participation’ of almost an entire population, which was a crucial factor in 
the commitment of such widespread human rights violations.63 In 100 days, between 
500.000 and 1.000.000 Tutsi’s were massacred and mostly, with the use of machetes 
and ordinary firearms.64 A mass murder of such proportion can only occur, if it 
receives a wide support or acceptance from a whole population group. 
4. The ‘ius puniendi issue’ – Criminal Punishment in ICL without a Sovereign? 
The next significant difference can be explained under the so called ‘ius puniendi 
issue’ or the general question, ‘whether and how punitive power can exist at the 
supranational level without a sovereign?’65 At the international level no real 
‘sovereign’, such as a parliament, a monarch or a ruler, with a unilateral legislative 
and executive power to punish, exist. Within this broader topic several important 
normative and practical points must be considered. 
Within the normative level significant differences in comparing the national and 
international level can be found. Firstly, the most important point results from a 
general principle in international (treaty) law. Principally, only states are bound to 
certain law (treaty), as in the Rome Statute, which have signed and ratified the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  	   Reuss,	  pp.	  5	  ff.;	  Even	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  against	  the	  government	  fighting	  rebels,	  an	  acceptance	  within	  
the	  community	  –	  at	  least	  within	  the	  narrower	  one	  –	  cannot	  be	  challenged.	  
63	  	   Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Leave	  None	  to	  Tell	  the	  Story:	  Genocide	  in	  Rwanda,	  Introduction	  –	  Popular	  
Participation.	  
64	  	   Human	   Rights	   Watch,	   Leave	   None	   to	   Tell	   the	   Story:	   Genocide	   in	   Rwanda,	   Introduction	   -­‐	   The	  
Genocide.	  
65	  	   Ambos,	  Punishment	  without	  a	  Sovereign?,	  p.	  1.	  Whereas	   the	  author	  under	   this	   topic	   considers	  
more	  the	  theoretical	  shortcomings	  of	  ICL,	  within	  this	  work	  from	  this	  point	  resulting	  consequences	  
will	  be	  considered.	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agreement.66 This means that individuals or at least a group of individuals (the 
individual state) can decide whether generally to be governed by the rules of the 
Rome Statute or not. At the national criminal law level, individuals or groups of 
individuals usually don’t have such a choice. This general possibility of choice leads 
to a further important difference concerning the permanence of an international 
(‘supranational’67) criminal jurisdiction. Even if the Rome Statute generally 
established the first permanent international criminal court, there is still no 
permanent (international)68 jurisdiction for all situations occurring in the world.69  
Lastly, a significant difference at the normative level can be found in the role of the 
UN Security Council, which is of particular relevance in two situations. For the first 
situation, the ICC gets jurisdiction about special (not treaty-bound) cases only via a 
referral by the UN Security Council, Article 13 (b) Rome Statute. Whereas in the 
second situation, the UN Security Council is empowered to halt an on-ongoing 
(treaty-bound) procedure or trial of the ICC, Article 16 Rome Statute. In both cases a 
from the normal criminal punishment system different, independent and non-
revisable ‘power’ can establish the jurisdiction of the ICC or can hamper a 
prosecution or punishment of a perpetrator. However, it must be taken into account 
that also in national criminal law similar possibilities, to spare an evidentially 
criminal from punishment, exist. The most common national possibility is perhaps 
the pardon.70 Additionally, a wide range of similar opportunities for the criminal 
court and the prosecutor, where an evidently criminal will not be punished, can be 
found in all stages of the national criminal law systems.71 But at least the case of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  	   This	   means	   not	   that	   citizens	   of	   non-­‐state	   parties	   can	   commit	   international	   core	   crimes	   on	  
territories	  of	  non-­‐state	  parties	  without	  generally	   facing	  criminal	  punishment.	  There	   is	  no	  doubt	  
that	   the	  worst	   international	   crimes	   are	   punishable	   under	   international	   customary	   law,	   see	   the	  
Nuremberg	  Charter	  or	  the	  statutes	  of	  the	  international	  (ad	  hoc)	  tribunals.	  
67	  	   Ambos,	  Punishment	  without	  a	  Sovereign?,	  p.	  1.	  
68	  	   In	   this	   context,	   it	   must	   be	   clarified	   that	   even	   in	   these	   cases	   a	   permanent	   jurisdiction	   exist,	  
however	  no	  permanent	  jurisdiction	  of	  an	  international	  criminal	  court.	  Because	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  
universal	  jurisdiction	  in	  cases	  of	  committed	  international	  core	  crimes,	  a	  permanent	  jurisdiction	  of	  
national	  criminal	  court	  is	  even	  in	  these	  cases	  not	  in	  question.	  
69	  	   In	  non-­‐treaty-­‐bound	  situations	  a	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  ICC	  can	  be	  established	  only	  through	  a	  referral	  
by	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  under	  Chapter	  VII	  (Article	  13	  (b)	  Rome	  Statute).	  	  
70	  	   The	   possibility	   of	   a	   pardon	   is	   recognized	   in	   the	   most	   national	   criminal	   systems	   in	   the	   world.	  
Usually	  monarchs	  or	  presidents	  can	  give	  a	  pardon	  and	  their	  decisions	  are	  normally	  not	  reversible	  
by	  a	  court,	  see	  for	  instance:	  Germany	  (Article	  60	  (2)	  GG);	  Russia	  (Article	  89	  (c)	  Constitution	  R.F.),	  
USA	  (Article	  2,	  section	  2	  U.S.-­‐Constitution).	  	  	  
71	   Such	  possibilities	  are	  mostly	  grounded	  on	  practical	  considerations:	  Perpetrators,	  who	  support	  the	  
solving	  of	  crimes,	  avoiding	  new	  crimes	  or	  recompensed	  their	  conduct.	  Therefore	  they	  can	  enjoy	  
‘impunity’	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  even	  when	  they	  committed	  a	  crime	  evidently.	  For	  instance,	  
within	   the	  German	   criminal	   law	   several	   examples	   can	   be	   found:	   According	   §	   36b	   (1)	   StGB	   the	  
court	  can	  desist	   from	  punishment	  completely	   if	   the	  accused	  person	  has	  helped	  substantially	   to	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Article 13 (b) Rome Statute, that an independent ‘power’ can establish the 
jurisdiction of a criminal court, seems uncommon in national criminal law systems. 
 
Furthermore, crucial practical differences are resulting from the absence of a real 
‘sovereign’. The system of the ICC lacks in general, its own executive power and 
always depends from the cooperation of its state parties or other international 
institutions in enforcing its decisions.72 The ICC itself has neither the recourses to 
force an accused person to stand trial before the Court or to enforce a prison term on 
a convicted person.73 Whereas at the national level, criminal courts are usually 
empower with such a direct executive power to enforce their decisions. At the 
international level the ICC is cogent depending on the cooperation of the state 
parties. Additionally, the preamble of the Rome Statute state that ‘nothing in the 
statute shall be taken as an authorizing any State Party to intervene in an armed 
conflict or in the internal affairs of any State’ and therefore also an attempt to arrest 
an accused individual on the territory of a different state, must general considered as 
unlawful. Furthermore, the availability of power and resources can play a major role 
in other areas of the work of the Court. Although, according to Article 54 of the 
Rome Statute, the Prosecutor of the ICC has extensive authority in investigating a 
situation, for a direct or comprehensive investigation the office of the Prosecutor is 
also cogent depending on the cooperation of the state where the certain situation 
occurred. In a situation where this state refuses cooperation with the ICC, the 
Prosecutor is constrained to indirect information. The Court itself is faced with the 
similar problems in establishing the truth during the trial. Such a lack of (at least 
direct) executive and investigative power is usually not witnessed on the national 
level.  On the other hand, it must be taken into account that these problems are not 
cogently excluded in the national criminal law. Of course, national criminal courts 
normally have the power to execute their decisions within the borders of their 
country. However, if the accused individual leaved the country for some reasons – 
and such cases because of the globalization becomes more and more important – the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
solve	   a	   serious	   or	   to	   avoid	   a	   serious	   crime.	   Furthermore,	   the	   German	   criminal	   law	   for	   tax	  
offences	  determines	  in	  §	  370	  AO	  the	  completely	  impunity	  of	  offenders,	  who	  later	  corrects	  their	  
declarations	   and	   pay	   the	   evaded	   taxes.	   In	   this	   case	   they	   become	   completely	   impunity,	   even	   if	  
they	  have	  evaded	  taxes	  into	  the	  millions	  and	  there	  is	  normally	  an	  imprisonment	  sentence	  up	  to	  
10	  years	  for	  such	  a	  crime.	  
72	  	   See:	  Articles	  86	  ff.	  Rome	  Statute.	  
73	  	   Schabas,	  pp.	  169	  ff.	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national courts then are facing usually the same problem how the ICC.74 In such 
cases also the national criminal courts depends on support by institutions of other 
countries.   
5. Usually Outstanding Position of Perpetrators in ICL 
The next important difference concerns the concrete position of the perpetrator 
within a certain state. In contrast to national criminal law the international criminal 
law ‘average’ perpetrators prosecuted by the ICC usually have or had outstanding 
positions in their countries. In the extreme case, the accused person is still a sitting 
head of a state or another still acting high official within an actual government and 
therefore has still a high influence to an on-going conflict, both politically and 
effectively. Even in the normative context, the problem of immunity, generally, must 
be taken into account.75 More practice-oriented it should be looked to the possible 
serious practical consequences. What’s happens if a sitting head of a state leaves his 
position to stand trial before an international criminal court? Would it lead to a 
destabilization of the state system or of the affected country and would the conflict 
possibly deteriorate into more crimes and human rights violations?  Occurrences 
within the last decades have shown the (negative) impacts, a displacement of sitting 
heads of states (even when they were despots, dictators or committed crimes under 
ICL) can have in practice. The (democratic) developments in Iraq, Libya, or Egypt 
have not stopped human rights violation.76 Even the mentioned occurrences were not 
mainly based on actions under ICL, the same problems probably occur, if the ICC 
takes actions against sitting heads of states and is able to get hold of them. Such 
questions and deliberations typically do not arise in national criminal law situations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  	   A	   local	   exception	   was	   determined	   within	   the	   European	   Union	   (EU)	   with	   the	   European	   Arrest	  
Warrant	  (EAW).	  
75	  	   Even	   some	   international	   courts	   denied	   a	   functional	   immunity	  of	   an	   acting	  high	   state	  official	   in	  
cases	   of	   international	   core	   crimes,	   for	   instance	   the	   Special	   Court	   for	   Sierra	   Leone	   (Appeal	  
Chamber)	  in	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Charles	  Taylor,	  31.	  May	  2004,	  par.	  43	  ff.)	  and	  Article	  27	  Rome	  Statute	  
determines	  generally	  the	   irrelevance	  of	  an	  official	  capacity	  of	  an	  accused	  person,	  there	  are	  still	  
doubts	   concerning	   this	   point.	   The	   International	   Court	   of	   Justice	   determined	   in	   Democratic	  
Republic	   of	   Congo	   v.	   Belgium,	   14.	   February	   2002,	   par.	   58	   ff.	   that	   exceptions	   can	   still	   exist,	   for	  
instance	  when	  a	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  ICC	  is	  questionable	   in	  a	  special	  case.	  See	  also	  African	  Union,	  
Decision	   on	   Africa’s	   Relationship	   with	   the	   International	   Criminal	   Court	   (October	   2013),	   which	  
‘REAFFIRMS	  the	  principles	  deriving	  from	  national	  laws	  and	  international	  customary	  law	  by	  which	  
sitting	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  other	  senior	  state	  officials	  are	  granted	  immunities	  during	  their	  tenure	  
of	  office’.	  	  	  




6. The ICC’s Principle of Complementary  
The principle of complementary statutes a further significant difference comparing to 
national criminal law. According to the Preamble of the Rome Statute, the Court 
shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction. Article 20 Rome Statute 
takes up the common ne bis in idem principle. Article 20 (3) Rome Statute 
determines special rules concerning the complementary system within the Rome 
Statute. Accordingly, the ICC finally can decide whether the steps and efforts of the 
affected national prosecution system were sufficient or not. Therefore cases are 
thinkable, where all at national level, conceivably involved persons (prosecutor, 
defence, court and victim), arrive at the conclusion that there are not enough 
evidences for a crime committed by the perpetrator. Even in such a case the ICC 
could ‘overrule’ the (consensual) national view in arguing that the prosecution was 
not sufficient. Such a solution is unfamiliar within the national criminal law level and 
is also not used in the system of the international ad-hoc courts.77 
7. Formal Conflict between National and ICL? 
Arguably, another distinction may be found in the possibility of a conflict between 
national and international criminal law, resulting from the applicability of formal 
international criminal law beside formal national criminal law.78 As a result, a 
possible perpetrator could become a special ‘normative conflict’.79 In a case where a 
formal national criminal law allows a certain behaviour, which is prohibited under 
international criminal law, the perpetrator can face a special conflict situation, which 
is nearly impossible in a pure national criminal law situation.80 Even when such a 
situation is generally thinkable, the scope of application seems quite minor. At least, 
in the cases of genocide and war crimes, such a normative conflict is from the outset 
excluded. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  	  	  See	   Article	   9	   (2)	   ICTYSt	   (‘The	   International	   Court	   shall	   have	   primacy	   over	   national	   courts.’)	   or	  
Article	  8	  (2)	  ICTRSt	  (‘The	  International	  Tribunal	  for	  Rwanda	  shall	  have	  the	  primacy	  over	  national	  
courts	  of	  all	  States.’).	  
78	  	   Reuss,	  p.	  5.	  
79	  	   Reuss,	  pp.	  7	  ff.	  
80	  	   Reuss,	  ibid.	  He	  is	  referring	  for	  instance	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Guantanamo,	  where	  American	  soldiers	  
following	  orders	   (arguably)	   fully	   covered	  by	  US	   law,	  but	  possibly	   infringe	   international	   criminal	  
law,	  namely	  fulfil	  crimes	  against	  humanity,	  Article	  7	  Rome	  Statute.	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8. Conclusion  
In conclusion several important differences exist between the criminal law on a 
national level and the criminal law established by the Rome Statute. These 
differences mainly lie in the nature of relevant crimes (‘normal’ crimes v. ‘macro 
crimes’), the relationship between the perpetrator and his or her environment 
(condemnation by the environment v. support by the environment), the lack of a 
sovereign in ICL (the national courts power to force their decisions v. increased 
voluntary participation necessary in the case of the ICC), and the position or 
influence of the perpetrator (usually no power to hinder a prosecution v. usually 
outstanding position and high influence).  These findings show that a simple and 
unquestioned transfer of the common purposes of criminal punishment from the 
national to the supranational level seems critically. Instead, it seems necessary to 
take these differences into account and ask for every particular utilitarianism effect, 











Transfer of the Common Utilitarian Effects to the ICL 
1. Introduction  
This chapter seeks to build on the outcomes of the last two chapters and answer the 
main questions whether the common utilitarian effects in national criminal law are 
applicable similarly in the case of the Rome Statute and whether the ICC has in 
general the ability to prevent human rights violations in future. Some decisions of 
international criminal courts and several international criminal law scholars take the 
general view that there are no cogent reasons for a distinction between the 
(utilitarian) purposes of punishment in national and international level and that it is 
possible to transfer them from the national to the international level without any 
exceptions.81 However, more and more doubts have arisen, mainly grounded on the 
important differences between the national and the supranational level.82 Two 
important general points must be clarified before providing the answer to these main 
questions. 
Firstly, this Chapter does not try to determine a certain degree of the different 
utilitarianism effects in ICL, especially under the system of the Rome Statute.83 To 
answer our main question this seems also not necessary.  Instead, it will be sufficient 
to demonstrate that these effects are not cogently and completely excluded, or rare 
ineffective in the case of the ICC.  
Secondly, experiences concerning international criminal courts and the ICC in the 
past are only of limited suitability to prove or deny a positive influence of the ICC to 
human rights. In this context, it was for instance, argued that the Moscow 
Declaration84 of 1943 during the on-going World War II and the installation of the 
ICTY during the on-going conflict in the former Yugoslavia were unable to deter the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  	   Prosecutor	  v.	  Kupreskic,	  ICTY	  (Trial	  Chamber),	  14.	  January	  2000,	  par.	  848;	  Werle,	  p.	  30	  ff.	  	  
82	  	   Reuss,	  p.	  3.	  speaks	  about	  an	  ‘obviously	  to	  optimistic	  view’.	  	  
83	  	   This	  seems	  also	  not	  possible.	  Even	  in	  national	  criminal	  law	  –	  how	  showed	  -­‐	  the	  certain	  degree	  of	  
the	  different	  utilitarianism	  effects	  is	  still	  controversial.	  Taking	  this	  into	  account,	  how	  should	  it	  be	  
possible	  to	  determine	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  these	  effects	  in	  the	  relatively	  new	  ICL?	  
84	  	   The	  Moscow	  Declaration,	  which	  was	  issued	  about	  one	  and	  a	  half	  years	  before	  the	  end	  of	  World	  
War	  II,	  determined	  the	  liability	  of	  Nazi	  leaders	  under	  international	  criminal	  law	  for	  during	  the	  war	  
committed	  crimes.	   It	  was	   the	  basis	   for	   the	  London	  Charter	  as	   the	  grounding	  document	   for	   the	  
Nuremberg	  Trials	  after	  World	  War	  II.	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perpetrators.85 Such an (isolated) resort seems critical. These international actions 
were quite limited in their quantity, and concerned only a fraction part of the de-facto 
occurred international crimes in past. Furthermore, even if it is clear that these 
mentioned measures had no influence on the general situations, it cannot be said in 
absolute terms that there was no positive influence in certain situations or on certain 
involved individuals. Similar problems must be considered within an argumentation 
on the other side. For instance, during the Review Conference of the Rome Statute, it 
was argued that certain cases show that the work of the ICC and even the 
announcement of possibly measures had positive influence on human rights.86 In this 
context, a few cases were mentioned, such as the situation in Côte d’Ivoire in 2004, 
the situation in Georgia in 2008, and the criminal trial against Thomas Lubanga (the 
latter one had reportedly, led to the release of 3000 child soldiers in Nepal).87 In all 
these cases, a strong temporal connection exists between measures of the Court and 
following positive reaction of involved leaders. However, this strong temporal 
connection can establish an indication, but no evidence or general rule. To use these 
cases as cogent evidences, the exclusion of other reasons for the mentioned (positive) 
behaviour of involved leaders would be necessary. To establish a general rule in 
referring to these cases, an essentially larger number of cases or references must be 
required. As a consequence of these shortcomings, the ability of the ICC to prevent 
future human rights violations can be proved only, when it can be demonstrated that 
the common utilitarianism affects in national criminal law can be transferred 
generally straight to the international level. 
2. General Deterrence by the ICC   
This section address the ‘general deterrence’ effect, namely whether the ICL under 
the Rome Statute can deter other persons from committing similar international 
crimes. In this context, an extensive clash of opinions exists. These diverse opinions 
range from, the existence of only a ‘marginal’ deterrent impact88 to that the existence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  	   Reuss,	  p.	  3.	  
86	  	   Mendez,	  para.	  17	  ff.	  
87	  	   Mendez,	  para.	  18	  ff.	  
88	  	  	  Ku/Nzelibe,	  p.	  832;	  Reuss,	  	  pp.	  7	  f.	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of the ICC can deter perpetrators extensively, and even pre-trial actions of the Court 
before starting or during an early stage of a conflict can deter potential perpetrators.89  
In answering this question, particularly two aforementioned key distinctions between 
the national and international level are relevant, namely the ‘lack of a sovereign’ and 
the ‘outstanding position of perpetrators.’ 
a) Lack of a Sovereign  
The most important influential points or differences can be found clearly under the 
generic term of ‘lack of a sovereign’ comparable with the national level. As 
previously mentioned, both the special and the general deterrence effect are primarily 
based on the expectation that an individual weighs possible advantages in the 
intended crime with the disadvantages of a possible conviction under the criminal 
law system.90 The more possibilities an individual has to avoid a prosecution, a 
conviction or just the practical execution of decisions of the ICC, the lower the 
deterrence effect will be. In this context it must be looked upon, especially on the 
following points at the normative and practical level. 
Firstly, some of the most powerful and most populated countries in the world, like 
China, India, Russia, or the USA are not state parties of the Rome Statute. This 
shows a general normative (deterrence) ‘dilemma’ in in the case of the Rome Statute 
- the general need of signing and ratifying the international agreement. The Court has 
usually no jurisdiction for international crimes committed by individuals of non-state 
parties on the territory of a non-state-party. In these cases, only via a special referring 
of the UN Security Council, a jurisdiction can be established.91 This requirement 
implies that actually, the majority of the world population has a fundamentally lower 
risk in being prosecuted by the ICC in the case of committing international crimes. 
For individuals belonging to this majority, the deterrence effect is obviously reduced. 
On the other hand, political developments in connection with the installation of the 
ICC show that even in these cases a general deterrence effect cannot be denied 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  	   Mendez,	  par.	  17	  ff.;	  Olasolo,	  p.	  13.	  
90	   	   Feuerbach,	   pp.	   44	   f.	   It	   will	   not	   be	   considered	   these	   criminals,	   who	   act	   not	   in	   such	   a	   rational	  
manner.	   In	   both	   levels	   of	   criminal	   law	   these	   concept	   is	   failing	   in	   general	   in	   cases	   of	   certain	  
individuals.	  Both	  the	  individual	  who	  is	  acting	  in	  the	  head	  of	  the	  moment	  in	  national	  criminal	  law	  
and	   a	   rebel	   leader	   who	   is	   just	   fighting	   to	   stay	   alive	   will	   be	   not	   deterred	   from	   possible	  
consequences	  under	  a	  criminal	  law	  system.	  Insofar	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  levels	  
of	  criminal	  law.	  	  
91	  	   See	  Articles	  12	  (2),	  13	  (b)	  Rome	  Statute.	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completely. Otherwise, it would unexplainable why the USA, as one of the most 
powerful countries in the world is trying to avoid in general, the prosecutions of their 
own nationals before the ICC through national legislatively measures, the 
interference of the UN Security Council or diplomatic channels. To prevent possible 
prosecutions from the outset, the USA in particular enacted the national American 
Service Member Protection Act (ASPA),92 used its veto power within the UCSC93 
and agreed non-extradition arrangements with a large number of other countries.94 
When even the USA that wields enormous power and influences, and is without 
direct treaty-obligations seems to be forced to take such comprehensive measures in 
avoiding a (theoretical) prosecution of their nationals, one point becomes clear. 
Today no individual person, no matter of a treaty-based jurisdiction of the ICC and 
how powerful protectors of this individual person are, can be absolutely sure, to 
avoid a prosecution or conviction by the ICC. 
Secondly, the ICC lacks in general its own (practical) executive power, which could 
become relevant in the context of the ‘general deterrence effect’. When a criminal 
justice system is unable to fulfil its function in practice and especially, unable to 
enforce its decision, for a criminal person the risk of punishment is evidently, lower. 
So, if an accused individual finds a ‘safe haven’, be it at the territory of his own state 
or at the territory of a non-state party, the possibilities of the Court effectively 
performing its duty are weakened. This weakness can lead to a direct (negative or 
decreasing) impact on the deterrence effect.95 Reference can be made to the case of 
Omar Al-Bashir in Sudan and that of Joseph Kony in Uganda. Although, the ICC 
issued arrest warrants against these persons, the Prosecutor was until now unable to 
enforce these decisions.96 On the other hand, the following points have to be taken 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  	   The	  ASPA	  (enacted	  2.	  August	  2002)	  and	  its	  amendments	  are	  containing	  several	  provisions,	  e.g.	  a	  
prohibition	   for	   US	   authorities	   to	   cooperate	  with	   the	   ICC	   (sec.	   2004	   ASPA)	   or	   the	   possibility	   to	  
measures	  to	  free	  US	  citizens	  in	  custody	  of	  the	  ICC	  (sec.	  2008	  ASPA).	  	  
93	  	   In	  2002	  the	  USA	  tried	  to	  use	  its	  UN	  Security	  Council	  veto	  to	  block	  a	  renewal	  of	  the	  mandates	  of	  
several	   UN	   peacekeeping	   missions,	   unless	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council	   agreed	   to	   permanently	  
exempt	  U.S.	  citizens	   from	   jurisdiction	  of	   the	   ICC.	  Even	   this	  attempt	   failed,	   the	  USA	  could	   reach	  
temporarily	   exemption	   through	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council,	   Resolution	   S/RES/1422	   (2002)	   and	   a	  
renewal	   for	   one	  more	   year	  with	   the	  UN	  Security	   Council,	  Resolution	   S/RES/1487	   (2003).	   These	  
decisions	  were	  based	  of	  the	  provision	  of	  Article	  16	  Rome	  Statute.	  	  
94	  	   According	  Article	  98	  (2)	  Rome	  Statute	  ‘the	  Court	  may	  not	  proceed	  with	  a	  request	  for	  surrender	  or	  
assistance	  which	  would	  require	  the	  requested	  state	  to	  act	  inconsistently	  with	  its	  obligations	  under	  
international	   agreements’.	   Such	   agreements	   pursue	   the	   purpose	   that	   accused	   US	   nationals	  
cannot	  be	  extradited	  to	  the	  ICC,	  while	  they	  are	  staying	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  a	  state	  party.	  	  	  
95	  	   For	  instance	  Reuss,	  p.	  9.	  	  
96	  	   Mendez,	  para.	  23.	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into account in this context. Firstly, it must be expected that at least, state-parties of 
the Rome Statute fulfil their obligations under the ICC. Secondly, it is not 
uncommon that even countries, which are not state parties, effectuate decisions of the 
Court or at least cooperate with the ICC.97 Therefore, a perpetrator can become very 
limited in his territorial radius of action.98 Additionally, a perpetrator can never have 
an absolute security, that it is possible to find such an opportunity after committing 
international crimes, or that such a possible opportunity is not only a temporal 
solution. Reference can be made to the former president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, 
who got political asylum in Nigeria 2003, but subsequently was arrested and 
extradited to stand trial before the Special Court of Sierra Leone in 2006.99 Because 
of these points, the ICC’s lack of practical executive power no longer can establish a 
guarantee for impunity.  
b) Outstanding Position of the Perpetrator 
Furthermore, the often outstanding position of perpetrators could have an influence 
on the deterrence effect in different ways. Political connections or influence could 
help avoid a prosecution before an international criminal court. Within the normative 
system of the Rome Statute, this can take place via the interventions	   of the UN 
Security Council according Article 16 of the Rome Statute in the case of treaty-base 
applicability of the Rome Statute or just trough inaction of the UN Security Council 
in the case of no treaty-based applicability of the Rome Statute, Article 13 (b) Rome 
Statute. Furthermore, a pure practical solution must be taken into account - the 
granting of asylum or exile by a third state.100 Above all, the latter alternative can 
become even more relevant in the cases of on-going conflicts where the suspect is 
still in power. The international community in these cases normally have, at least in 
practical, no problem in providing a ‘safe haven’ in exchange for an end to a 
conflict.101 Also these points could lower the deterrence effect. On the other hand, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  	   Mendez,	  para.	  7;	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State,	  Daily	  Press	  Briefing,	  20.	  September	  2013.	  Within	  the	  
press	   briefing	   the	   spokesperson	  mentioned	   explicitly	   the	   arrest	  warrant	   of	   the	   ICC	   against	   the	  
Sudanese	   president	   Al-­‐Bashir,	   as	   a	   point	   of	   consideration	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Omar	   Al-­‐Bashir’s	  
application	  to	  attend	  the	  meeting	  of	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  in	  New	  York.	  
98	  	   Mendez,	  para.	  23	  is	  explicitly	  refereeing	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Al-­‐Bashir	  in	  Sudan.	  
99	  	   Rahmsdorf,	  Diktatoren	  im	  Exil	  –	  verbannt	  in	  den	  goldenen	  Käfig,	  15	  February	  2011.	  
100	  Within	   the	   international	   community	   such	  measures	   have	   a	   long	   tradition	   and	   are	   even	   today	  
widely	  practiced,	  see	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  cases	  in	  the	  past	  Chapter	  IV,	  pp.	  42	  ff.	  
101	  	  See	  e.g.	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Qaddafi	  (Libya)	  New	  York	  Times,	  U.S.	  and	  Allies	  Seek	  a	  Refuge	  for	  Qaddafi,	  
16	   April	   2011,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Saleh	   (Yemen)	   U.S.	   Department	   of	   State,	   Press	   conference,	   26	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the already mentioned argument – that there is no absolutely security for a 
perpetrator - must be taken into account. Also a head of state or a high state official 
cannot be sure that the UN Security Council will stop a prosecution before the ICC 
respectively will not establish a jurisdiction of the ICC via a referral to the ICC 
according to Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute. In addition, the mentioned 
possibility of granting asylum by a third state can fail because of several reasons. 
Beside just practical problems within the implementation of such a decision,102 the 
international community normally loose interest in finding such a solution, if the 
individual loosed its power before such an ‘agreement’ could be reached.  
In conclusion, the ‘general deterrence effect’ of the ICC can be lower than in national 
criminal law. The main reasons for this decrease are not lying in the system of the 
ICC itself. Instead, they lie often in political considerations, decisions, or practical 
issues in special cases, which can lead to a decreasing of the ‘general deterrence 
effect’. However, today no offender – no matter what position the offender is or 
whether treaty-based jurisdiction of the ICC is in existence or not – has a guarantee 
that he or she can escape.  
3. Special deterrence 
A further point to consider is the ‘special deterrence effect’, which means, the 
individual perpetrator, who was sanctioned under criminal law, shall not repeat the 
crime.103 Two points under the topic ‘nature of crimes’, mentioned above are of 
special importance in this context. In the case of a conviction by the ICC, a sentence 
of many years of imprisonment will follow. According to Article 77 (1) Rome 
Statute, a specified number of years of imprisonment or life imprisonment are 
stipulated. Other sentences are only ‘additional’ options for the Court, Article 77 (2) 
Rome Statute. If one additionally takes into consideration that the relevant crimes 
normally required a structural support, it seems that there is often no (more) special 
deterrence for the individual convicted person necessary. Therefore, it could be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
January	   2012	   or	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Assad	   (Syria)	   the	   British	   Prime	  Minister	   David	   Cameron	   in	   an	  
Interview	  with	  TV	  Al	  Arabia,	  06	  November	  2012.	  
102	  	  There	   are	   actually	   two	   cases	   to	   which	   in	   this	   context	   can	   be	   referred:	   Julian	   Assange	   in	   the	  
embassy	  of	  Ecuador	  in	  London	  and	  Edward	  Snowden	  in	  the	  Russian	  Federation.	  Even	  both	  were	  
granted	  asylum	  in	  Ecuador	  respectively	  in	  Venezuela,	  they	  are	  just	  practically	  not	  able	  to	  travel	  to	  
these	  countries.	  	  	  
103	  	  Wilson,	  p.	  54.	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argued that there will be in general, a very low practical possibility for a convicted 
perpetrator to repeat earlier committed international crimes, after being released from 
prison.104 This view however, remains too narrow. It is not only the conviction itself 
that can deter from repeating an earlier committed crime. Also, the readiness to 
initiate investigations by the Prosecutor or the launch of a trial before the Court can 
have this effect.105 In this situation, the certain individual, who may still be in power 
at time of the investigation, can clearly see that a criminal behaviour will be not 
tolerated. Reference can be made to the situations in Kenya during the elections in 
2007 and 2013. After widespread violence and massive human rights violation 
during and after the election 2007, several high Kenyan politicians, among them the 
actual president Kenyatta, were prosecuted before the ICC in 2011 for their role in 
the conflict. During the following election in 2013 the again expected violence did 
not occur.106 It shows that an ‘individual deterrence’ is not from the outset excluded 
under the system of the Rome Statute, even if this example is no cogent evidence for 
a positive influence of the ICC to human rights. 
4. Educative deterrence 
This utilitarianism effect received probably the least critics in international criminal 
law. Even opponents, who challenged other effects, such as the individual or general 
deterrence effect, strongly recognized the importance of this element in international 
criminal law.107 This is not surprising. If substantive criminal law will not be applied 
over a longer period of time, individuals will no longer interpret the criminal 
behaviour as ‘wrong’.108 In both levels the situation is after the (permanent) 
installation of the ICC quite similar and none of the showed differences between the 
national and international criminal law has a cogent or fundamental influence on this 
utilitarianism element.  The ‘lack of a sovereign’ and in particular, the fact that some 
situations (where no treaty-bound jurisdiction of the ICC exists) remain irregularly 
being prosecuted before international courts, is insufficient argument against 
effectiveness of the ‘educative deterrence’ under the Rome Statute. As a result of the 
general treaty concept of the Rome Statute, only the individuals and situations under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  	  Reuss,	  p.	  5.	  	  
105	  	  Olasolo,	  p.	  13	  
106	  	  Kimenyi,	  Kenya:	  A	  Country	  Redeemed	  after	  a	  Peaceful	  Election,	  02	  April	  2013.	  
107	  For	  instance:	  Ku/Nzelibe,	  p.	  787;	  Reuss,	  pp.	  12	  f.	  
108	  	  Wilson,	  p.	  54.	  Clarkson/Keating,	  p.	  39.	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the original (treaty-based) jurisdiction of the ICC can be considered. For these 
individuals, a permanent and consistent jurisdiction, which leads to a consistent 
education, should not be in question.109  
5. Reforming Element 
Furthermore, it must be asked whether the ‘reforming element’ can play a role in the 
Rome Statute. Two mentioned differences under the topics of ‘nature of crimes’ and 
‘relationship between the perpetrator and its environment’ could disbar this element 
in general in ICL. Firstly, after a long imprisonment of a convicted perpetrator, it 
seems unlikely that he will get the necessary support to repeat earlier committed 
international crimes. Because of this, it could be argued that it makes from the outset 
no sense to reform a person convicted by the ICC. However, like in the context of the 
‘special deterrence’ such a possibility is not completely excluded. It is not only the 
conviction itself, which can illustrate an individual person his or her wrongdoing and 
in this way reform the person in question. Even investigations by the Prosecutor or 
the launch of a trial before the ICC can lead to such a reformation. Secondly, it is 
important to look at the ‘relationship between perpetrators and their environment’. It 
was argued that a re-socialization or a reintegration is generally not necessary in ICL, 
because perpetrators are usually well integrated in society at the time of committing 
the crimes.110 References were made to the cases of former Nazi leaders in Germany 
or to the case of Radovan Karadžić in former Yugoslavia, who lived as normal and 
unobtrusive members of the society in the post-conflict period.111 However, this view 
remains to narrow. It may be that the perpetrators are well integrated in their closer 
environment during and after the conflict situation – however, there was and is 
precisely no integration in the value system of the international community. In this 
context a re-socialization or a reintegration seems still necessary or at least, not from 
the outset excluded. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  	  Additional,	   even	   if	   we	   have	   no	   ‘permanent	   jurisdiction’	   of	   an	   international	   court	   for	   the	   non-­‐
treaty-­‐bound	   situations,	   solely	   the	   permanent	   existence	   of	   the	   ICC	   led	   probably	   to	   a	   crucial	  
improvement	  concerning	  these	  situations.	  It	  seems	  quite	  questionable	  whether	  the	  UN	  Security	  
Council	  would	  have	  installed	  an	  ad-­‐hoc	  tribunal	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  Omar	  Al-­‐Bashir	  and	  Muammar	  Al-­‐
Gaddafi,	  which	  the	  council	  referred	  to	  the	  ICC	  and	  in	  this	  way	  established	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  
Court.	  	  
110	  	  Reuss,	  pp.	  9	  f.	  
111	  	  Reuss,	  p.	  9.	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6. Incapacitation effect 
Furthermore, we have to look to the ‘incapacitation effect’ within the system of the 
Rome Statute. When considering the individual perpetrator, on the first view, it 
seems absolutely clear that a jailed criminal should be not able to commit further 
crimes, particularly, when the prison is in The Hague and usually thousands of 
kilometres from the place of conflict. On the other hand, the different ‘nature of 
crimes’ must be considered in this context with a special attention. If it is recalled 
that this effect can be failed even in national criminal law if the incapacitated 
individual can resort to a criminal structure112 and one considers additionally, that 
international crimes are characterized as products of an exceptionally serious and 
dangerous collective violence and main perpetrators are usually able to resort to a 
comprehensive structure.113 Then the question could be asked whether this possible 
resort can have a negative influence on the ‘incapacitation effect’ within the system 
of the Rome Statute. Reference can be made here to two cases in Germany, in which 
the organisation or the collective element played an important role. The first one 
concerns an actually on-going case before a German criminal court, which is 
applying the (national) Code of Crimes against International Law 
(Völkerstrafgesetzbuch), the first time since its date of entry in 2002. Two original 
born Rwandans are accused of having committed crimes against humanity and war 
crimes in their capacities as President and Vice President of the rebel organisation 
Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in Rwanda and in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, respectively. One of the most important points 
within this case is that they arguably committed the most of the criminal acts, while 
they were physically in Germany in introducing their forces by SMS, Email or by 
telephone. This shows that within the modern world, with its modern communication 
tools, physical presence at the crime scene is not compulsory necessary. Of course, a 
higher monitoring can be expected, while a convicted criminal is in prison. However, 
even during an imprisonment such cases cannot cogent excluded, when the 
perpetrator can resort to a comprehensive structure. A picturesque example for this is 
the second mentioned German case. In the seventies and eighties of the last century 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  	  See	  Chapter	  I,	  pp.	  13	  f.	  
113	  	  Jäger,	  p.	  11.	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the main leaders of the terror group Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF)114 were 
incapacitated in Germany. Although, in this case the highest security standards were 
applied, they were still able to plan and order further terror acts like murders, bomb 
attacks, or kidnappings. However, even if there are cases thinkable, where an 
incapacitation cannot prevent the committing of future international crimes, such a 
constellation cannot be considered as the normal case. In conclusion, the mentioned 
differences cannot lead to exclusion or a fundamental decrease of this utilitarian 
effect under the Rome Statute.  In this context, the situations in national criminal law 
and under the Rome Statute are similar. If the convicted and imprisoned persons in 
both levels can revert to still powerful structures outside the prison, they are still able 
to commit (indirect) further crimes. However, the general ability of this utilitarian 
effect under the Rome statute in preventing future human rights violations is not in 
question.  
7. Restorative Justice and Condemnation 
At this point, the two last utilitarianism effects – restorative justice and 
condemnation - must be looked at. It can be not questioned that these two aspects 
generally have the ability to support the solving of complex conflict situations and by 
this, capable to prevent violent conflicts in the future.115 When compared to the 
national criminal law level, such a solution in international conflict situations will be 
probably much more complex, difficult, and the concrete outcome after such a 
process will be at the beginning often unclear or not easy predictable. But none of the 
highlighted key differences between the national criminal law and the system of the 
Rome statute can exclude these utilitarianism effects completely. Instead, because of 
the complexity and dimension of such conflict situations there will likely by no other 
alternative (practical) possibility, at least in an overall context.116 Reference can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  	  Rote	  Armee	  Fraktion	  (Red	  Army	  Fraction)	  was	  a	  left-­‐wing	  militant	  or	  terror	  group	  accountable	  for	  
several	  terror	  acts	  and	  killings	  of	  high	  politicians	  and	  other	  leaders	  in	  Germany.	  
115	  	  These	   problems	   are	   directly	   linked	   to	   the	   discussion	   of	   ‘peace	   v.	   justice’.	   It	   will	   be	   discussed	  
deeper	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  
116	  	  Because	  of	  the	  usually	  large	  number	  of	  perpetrators,	  it	  must	  be	  looked	  after	  alternative	  conflict	  
resolution	  tools.	  Of	  course,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  trial	  the	  most	  responsible	  persons	  before	  the	  ICC,	  see	  
also	   Article	   17	   (1)	   (d)	   Rome	   Statute.	   But	   what	   should	   happen	   with	   the	   other	   participants?	  
Generally	  the	  national	  criminal	  law	  have	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  for	  these	  individuals.	  But	  if	  one	  takes	  
into	  account	  that	  usually	  already	  the	  aiding	  and	  abetting	  in	  the	  case	  of	  such	  capital	  offences	  must	  
lead	  at	  least	  to	  a	  temporal	  prison	  term,	  the	  nearly	  insuperable	  obstacles	  become	  obviously.	  What	  
is	  happens	  if	  nearly	  a	  whole	  group	  of	  a	  national	  population	  will	  be	  imprisoned?	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made to examples in the past, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
South Africa,117 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone,118 or the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Chile.119 Additionally, the developments in 
Europe after the World War II, especially the massive improvement in Germany’s 
relationship / friendship to Poland and France, were mainly based on elements of 
reconciliation. These limited examples cannot establish a cogent proof for the crime 
preventing ability of these utilitarianism effects in ICL, but they can present, at the 
minimum, an indication of its effectiveness. In summarising these points, the general 
justification of these two utilitarian effects within the system of the Rome Statute 
cannot be challenged. 
8. Conclusion  
In conclusion, all the common utilitarian effects recognized and proven in national 
criminal law systems also have a justification within the Rome Statute. Therefore, 
the ICC generally, possesses the capability to prevent future (international) crimes 
and human rights violations. There exists no evidence, that one, several or all of the 
common utilitarianism effects are cogently excluded under the Rome Statute.  All the 
used arguments against such transferability and against a capability of the ICC to 
prevent future international crimes are not cogent. These criticisms concentrate only 
on certain individual utilitarian effect and don’t consider the whole system, in 
particular the mentioned interaction between the different utilitarianism effects. In 
addition, critics usually speak only about ‘marginal’ effects120, an ‘extremely low 
deterrence effect’,121 or arguing that the common purposes of punishment generally 
do not ‘fit the concept’ of international criminal law.122  
To confirm the crucial and increasing role of the ICC for the protection of human 
rights and to react to some more general critics concerning the justification or 
effectiveness of the ICC from a human right perspective, the following general points 
(concerning all utilitarian effects) are of a special importance. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  	  Report	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  (South	  Africa).	  	  
118	  	  Report	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  (Sierra	  Leone).	  
119	  	  Report	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  (Chile).	  
120	  	  Ku/Nzelibe,	  p.	  832.	  	  	  	  
121	  Reuss,	  p.	  9	  (“denkbar	  wenig“).	  
122	  Ambos,	  Impunidad,	  p.	  366	  (“passen”).	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Firstly, it must be taken into account that the ICC obviously has not reached its full 
capacity as at yet. The ICC is generally a quite new instrument within the 
international human rights protection system.123 It was only established a decade ago. 
Additionally, the concept of the Rome Statute is treaty-based. As a result, it is 
strongly depending from the participation of the international community. The more 
countries willing to accept and transfer decisions of the ICC, the higher the 
probability of a prosecution and therefore, the stronger the deterrence effects will 
become. The more countries accept in general the rules or principles of the Rome 
Statute as values of the whole international community, and show in this way that a 
committal of the worst international crimes will no longer be tolerated, the stronger 
the educative elements will become. Today, several large and powerful countries are 
still not state parties of the Rome Statute. Taken these points together, it must lead to 
the realisation that work still has to be done, that still comprehensive promotional 
work is necessary, and that the Court will only reach full efficiency and full capacity 
probably in the future. However, such expectable improvements must be taken into 
account when evaluating the influence of the ICC on the human rights situation in 
future. 
Secondly, special attention must be paid to the aforementioned interaction of the 
different utilitarianism effects of criminal law. All of the relevant effects, at least if 
seen individually, failed in cases with certain circumstances.124 The deterrence 
elements must fail from the outset, where a perpetrator is not acting rational. The 
educative and reforming elements must fail from the outset in the case, where 
individual persons are not willing to change their attitude and behaviour. As a 
consequence of these points, it is not possible to consider only certain isolated 
utilitarian effects. Instead it must be looked to the entirety of these effects.125 An 
argumentation in the way that only certain utilitarianism effects are substantially 
lowered or excluded within the Rome Statute, is not expedient in answering the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  	  Even	  the	  international	  criminal	  law	  itself	  existing	  already	  for	  a	  longer	  time,	  the	  first	  (permanent)	  
written	  international	  criminal	  law	  and	  the	  first	  permanent	  international	  criminal	  court	  were	  first	  
introduced	  through	  the	  Rome	  Statute.	  
124	  	  See	  for	  instance	  Wilson,	  pp.	  57	  f.	  	  
125	  Holding	  this	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  individual	  approaches	  in	  mind,	  the	  German	  Constitutional	  Court	  
(‘Bundesverfassungsgericht’),	  which	   applying	   in	   general	   a	  mixed	   theory	   (‘Vereinigungstheorie’),	  
has	   ruled	   in	   several	   grounding	  decisions,	   that	  all	   these	  well-­‐recognized	  purposes	   (including	   the	  
retributive	  elements,	  which	  were	  not	  so	  important	  for	  our	  work)	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  
and	  that	  there	  is	  no	  general	  priority	  of	  one	  of	  them,	  see	  e.g.	  Bundesverfassungsgericht,	  21	  June	  
1977,	  BVerfGE	  45,	  187	  (210).	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question whether the system of the ICC can in general prevent human rights violation 
in future, if simultaneously other not excluded utilitarianism elements exist. Within 
the national criminal law nobody would seriously challenge the general ability of 
criminal law in crime prevention, even if it is clear that also there all the recognized 
utilitarian effects can fail in special cases. 
Thirdly, it seems necessary to clarify the general expectations on the ICC. These 
expectations seem often too high, which can become sometimes counterproductive. 
If one promotes the ICC as the ultimate human right protection solution,126 it 
becomes easier to argue that the system of the Rome Statute failed, if massive human 
rights violations arose or were to arise in the future. The concept of the ICC is from 
the outset only one pillar in the human rights protection system.127 Even considering 
solely the field of criminal law, the Rome Statute can only be a part of the protection 
mechanism. By remembering that the ICC has jurisdiction only for the worst cases 
and the most responsible persons (Article 17 (1) (d) Rome Statute), it becomes 
obvious that the ICC’s utilitarianism effects are focused mainly or exclusively on 
these most responsible persons. To hold the followers or supporters (which are for 
the committing of such international crimes not less essentially) criminal liable, other 
(criminal law) measures are necessary. For instance, the normative and practical 
implementation of (customary) ICL into national criminal law is of particular 
importance. Furthermore, besides the different approaches in criminal law, a wide 
range of other protection mechanisms exist, which can help to prevent or end human 
rights violations.128 The UN Charter itself contains on the supranational level, 
extensive economic, political, and even military possibilities, for instance Articles 
41, 42 UN Charter. Similar measures (with a generally exceptions of military 
actions) are also possible on a bilateral or regional level. These points show that there 
is yet no ultimate human rights protection organ in existence. Only the simultaneous 
application of the wide variety of protection mechanism at international, regional and 
national level can guarantee an optimal protection of human rights. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  	  In	   this	  way	  Bensouda,	  Chief	  Prosecutor	  of	   the	   ICC,	  on	  a	   lecture	  on	  13	  April	  2012	   spokes	  about	  
‘The	  Rome	  Statute	  establishing	  the	  ICC	  provides	  a	  solution:	  Creating	  global	  Governance	  without	  a	  
global	  government.’	  
127	  	  In	   this	   context,	   there	   is	   no	   difference	   to	   the	   national	   criminal	   law	   systems.	   In	   both	   levels	   it	   is	  
absolutely	  clear,	  that	  criminal	  law	  alone	  is	  not	  able	  to	  avoid	  the	  committing	  of	  crimes	  in	  future.	  	  
128	  	  HREA,	  The	  United	  Nations	  Human	  Rights	  System.	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Fourthly, it must be considered the point of ‘political influence’ to the work of the 
Court.129 Even within the normative level of the Rome Statute, possibilities such as 
the power of the UN Security council to establish the jurisdiction of the ICC (Article 
13 (b) Rome Statute) or to defer an investigation or prosecution (Article 16 Rome 
Statute), exist. This point is often used as a general argument against the utilitarian 
effects resulting from the ICC. However, there are at least three reasons, why such a 
view seems to be incorrect. All state parties of the Rome Statute decided voluntarily 
to accept such possibilities of a political influence. Furthermore, certain particularly 
complex or difficult situation in international conflicts can probably only be solved 
through such possibilities of a political intervention.130 Lastly, individuals cannot be 
sure (at least, not absolutely) that such a political intervention will be used in their 
favour in individual situation. Therefore, these political opportunities seem necessary 
on the one hand, to react appropriately to certain situations. On the other hand, they 
not lead to a complete exclusion of utilitarianism effects of the ICC. 
Lastly, it must be mentioned the by far most important point in evaluating the 
(positive) influence of the ICC to human rights. It is necessary to consider in 
particular, the possible effects in one individual case and ask the following questions. 
What normally are the consequences, if only one individual leader decides not to 
commit international crimes because of the existence of the ICC? How many deaths 
of innocent men, women and children or how much indescribable harm for these 
potential victims can be prevented, if only one individual leader, with high political 
and actual influence, surrenders his or her intention or plans because of the existence 
of the ICC? This could lead to the prevention of indescribable harm or death of 
thousands or even many more people. Even if just one out of hundreds of potential 
perpetrators can be deterred, reformed or educated by the existence of the ICC, then 
the influence of the Rome Statute to the human right situation becomes enormous. 
Therefore, it seems in general, critical to argue that some (isolated) utilitarianism 
effects can only have a marginal or nominal importance in the context of the Rome 
Statute. 
In summary of these five points, it follows that the ICC – as measured by the general 
capabilities, the many-faceted general difficulties in finding a ‘one world solution’, 
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  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  point	  within	  Chapter	  IV.	  	  
130	  See	  the	  peace	  v.	  justice	  discussion,	  Chapter	  VI.	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and the general difficulties in negotiations concerning such new international 
institution that affects the sovereignty of national states – is already playing today, an 
important role within the global human right protection system. Beyond that, it can 






Special Situations or Circumstances in Africa – Can Measures of the 
ICC in special situations exclude or contradict the general positive 
influence of ICC to human rights? 
1. Introduction 
This Chapter seeks to answer the question whether in special circumstances or 
situations an intervention by the ICC could aggravate the human rights situation. In 
Chapter III, it was concluded that all utilitarianism elements are generally also 
applicable within the ICC system and that a general positive influence of the ICC to 
human rights cannot be seriously challenged.  However, additional and exceptional 
circumstances could (at least in special situations) completely exclude or even 
contradict these positive effects. There exist two of such developments that recently 
gained special relevance in Africa. These developments led to massive problems and 
resentments between the ICC on the one side and the AU and African countries on 
the other side. Firstly, situations concerning the controversy of ‘peace v. justice’ in 
an on-going conflict must be considered. It must be determined, whether and which 
(negative) consequences a direct intervention of the ICC in an on-going conflict can 
have. Secondly, because of the specially enhanced need of the participation of the 
state parties, it seems necessary to determine, whether and which (negative) 
influence an alleged infringement of the (human) rights of accused persons can have. 
In particular allegations concerning inequality in prosecution and the right of fair 
trial in international criminal proceedings must be considered. The ‘peace v. justice’ 
controversy as well as the human rights of possible perpetrators, were already of 
special relevance within the African context and are both still of extreme importance 
for the future of the ICC in Africa and the world as a whole.	  
2. ‘Peace v. Justice’ 
The first important point concerns the controversy of ‘peace v. justice’ and the 
question whether an early intervention by the ICC in an on-going conflict can 




In 2008 the AU in the context of the ongoing conflict in Darfur expressed the 
following: 
‘…its conviction that, in view of the delicate nature of the processes underway 
in the Sudan, approval by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the application by the ICC 
Prosecutor could seriously undermine the ongoing efforts aimed at facilitating 
the early resolution of the conflict in Darfur and the promotion of long-lasting 
peace and reconciliation in the Sudan as a whole and, as a result, may lead to 
further suffering for the people of the Sudan and greater destabilization with 
far-reaching consequences for the country and the region;’.131  
The ‘peace v. justice’ discussion was and is still highly controversial, exceptionally 
complex, very philosophical, and often has vague decisions on what wrong or right 
can be possible. This controversy exists as a typical phenomenon in ICL and it is 
unlikely to occur at the national criminal law level.132 Three of the presented main 
distinctions between the national and international level,133 are mostly responsible for 
it – the often ‘outstanding position’ of the accused person, the general ‘nature of 
crimes’, and the ‘lack of a sovereign’ in ICL. At the national level individuals, 
accused of (normal) crimes, (usually) are not influential enough to evade actions of 
the national criminal law system in practice. In national criminal law relevant crimes 
normally, does not affect such large numbers of victims, with exceptional 
consequences on the one side and such large numbers of participating perpetrators on 
the other side. The practical possibilities in enforcing measures of the criminal law 
system are not as limited as at the in international level. 
The ‘peace v. justice’ problem often arises in on-going conflicts with continuously 
occurring gross human rights violation. In these situations, there is a potential for an 
increased risk that any action of the ICC could provoke new crimes or an on-going 
negotiation process could be disrupted.134 But the question on the ‘peace v. justice’ 
goes beyond such cases of on-going conflicts. It concerns also the long term future of 
a country or a region after the factual end of the conflict and above all the question, 
how the opponent conflict parties can live in future together in peace. The scope of 
this work does not claim to offer a comprehensive overview on this controversial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131	  	  African	  Union,	  PSC/MIN/3,	  22	  September	  2008.	  
132	  	  Even	  it	  is	  not	  a	  common	  problem	  in	  national	  criminal	  law	  it	  is	  not	  cogent	  excluded.	  For	  instance	  in	  
the	  former	  German	  Democratic	  Republic	  (GDR)	  after	  the	  revolt	  in	  1953	  the	  government	  granted	  
a	  widespread	  amnesty	  to	  reduce	  the	  domestic	  political	  tensions.	  
133	  	  See	  Chapter	  II,	  pp.	  13	  ff.	  	  
134	  	  Stigen,	  p.	  421.	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topic. In response to the question, on the possible aggravating influences of measures 
by the ICC to human rights in special situation, this part focuses on cases of on-going 
conflicts and considers in particular, cases were accused persons are still in power 
and the Court undertakes in such situations, direct and on such certain persons, 
focused measures.	  
Reference will be made to relevant cases occurred in Africa where the ICC issued 
arrest warrants against involved persons while peace negotiations were still in 
process. Several stakeholders argued against the ICC intervention in such situations 
and pointed out that it hinders or excludes a negotiated solution and does not 
recognize alternative regional conflict-solution-models. Subsequently, it will be 
determined whether and which alternative measures in such situations exits, whether 
the Rome Statute recognizes such alternative measures in general or in an on-going 
conflict, and which concrete reactions in an on-going conflict are possible. 
a) Relevant cases in Africa 
Several cases can be found on the African continent where a lot of arguments are 
brought against the decisions of the ICC for early intervention in on-going conflict 
situations. These arguments have been made by the accused persons, countries, 
regional organisations or scholars.135 The primary arguments brought against the ICC 
in such context have been that the ICC does not consider ‘traditional justice’ 
sufficient and that the Courts inconsiderate and premature actions could escalate the 
conflict and therefore, hinder the possibility of a negotiated solution.  Reference can 
be made to two typical examples occurred within the last decade. These examples 
included more substantial actions of the Court namely, the issues of arrest warrants 
dispatched when an on-going conflict is in process.  
In the case of Uganda, the ICC issued arrest warrants against five active leaders of 
the rebel group Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which included Josef Kony.136 
Although, the decision received widespread support, 137 several involved mediators, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  	  Ping,	  Press	  Statement	  of	  AU	  Commissioner,	  29	  July	  2011;	  Communique	  of	  the	  142nd	  Meeting	  of	  
the	   Peace	   and	   Security	   Council,	   PCS/MIN/Comm	   (CXL	   II);	  Moy,	   Harvard	  Human	   Rights	   Journal,	  
Vol.	  19,	  	  pp.	  269	  ff.	  
136	  	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Kony,	  ICC	  (PTC	  II),	  08	  July	  2005.	  
137	  UN	  News	   Center,	   Annan	  Hails	   International	   Criminal	   Court’s	   Arrest	  Warrants	   for	   Five	  Ugandan	  
Rebels,	  14	  October	  2005;	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  ICC	  Takes	  Decisive	  Step	  for	  Justice	  in	  Uganda,	  14	  
October	  2005.	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regional religious and political leaders, argued against the court’s decision. The main 
arguments used against the decision of the ICC were that such issues of arrest 
warrants undermine the on-going peace efforts and that traditional justice concepts 
became obsolete because of these early measures of the Court.138 In taking an ex-post 
view, the following points seem from a special importance. Firstly, because of the 
arrest warrants the negotiations were not continued or at least compromised.139 
Secondly, despite comprehensive efforts none of the arrest warrants was enforced up 
to the present. Thirdly, the LRA committed further terrible crimes after the arrest 
warrants were issued and the negotiation process was failed.140 
Another case of significance to this discussion is that of Omar Al-Bashir, the current 
acting president of Sudan. He came into power in 1989, and since has been accused 
of massive and widespread human rights violations. Such violations includes: war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.141 These violations began in 2003 and 
are mostly carried out in the southern province Darfur.142 On 4 March 2009, the Pre-
Trial Chamber I of the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Al-Bashir in concluding 
that there are reasonable grounds to belief that Mr. Al-Bashir “is criminal 
responsible as an indirect perpetrator or an indirect co-perpetrator” for seven 
different kinds of crime under the Court’s jurisdiction, including war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.143 A second arrest warrant, based on reasonable grounds to 
belief that Mr. Al-Bashir committed genocide, followed on 12 July 2010.144 The 
reactions to these two arrest warrants were more extensive than in the above 
mentioned case of Uganda.  In this context the measures of the ICC led to political 
resentments and an AU’s open opposition against the ICC.145 Even formal decisions 
of the ICC against state parties were necessary, because they rejected to enforce 
these arrest warrants against Al-Bashir.146 The African opposition was 
overwhelming. Among other arguments against the ICC, such as a lack of 
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  See	   for	   a	   good	   overview	   about	   the	   situation	   and	   the	   arguments:	  Moy,	   Harvard	   Human	   Rights	  
Journal,	  Vol.	  19,	  pp.	  269	  ff.	  	  
139	  Moy,	  p.	  270.	  
140	  	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	   ‘Q&A	  on	  Joseph	  Kony	  and	  the	  Lord’s	  Resistance	  Army’.	  According	  Human	  
Rights	  Watch	  the	  LRA	  killed	  2.600	  civilians	  and	  abducted	  more	  than	  4.000	  people	  and	  more	  than	  
400.000	  people	  were	  displaced	  since	  2008.	  
141	  	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Sudan.	  
142	  	  Ibid.	  	  
143	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Al-­‐Bashir,	  ICC	  (PTC	  I),	  04	  March	  2009	  (First	  Arrest	  Warrant).	  
144	  	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Al-­‐Bashir,	  ICC	  (PTC	  I),	  12	  July	  2010	  (Second	  Arrest	  Warrant).	  
145	  Jean	  Ping,	  Press	  Statement	  of	  AU	  Commissioner,	  29	  July	  2011.	  
146	  Prosecutor	  v.	  Al-­‐Bashir,	  ICC	  (PTC	  I),	  12	  December	  2011	  (Malawi).	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jurisdiction of the Court,147 the accusation that the ICC is focusing on prosecuting 
African leaders148 or the allegations that the Western World has intentions of ‘neo-
colonialism’,149 the most used argument was that a peaceful solution of the Sudanese 
conflict will be more difficult now that such an arrest warrant had been issued.150 
From an ex-post view, the following points are of special importance. Firstly, the 
issue of the arrest warrants compromised and still is compromising a peaceful 
solution in the Sudan. The head of the relevant state with a massive influence to the 
conflict situation was several times excluded from attending meetings held by the 
AU. More recently, Omar Al-Bashir intended to take part in the UN General 
Assembly in New York, but for the visa problems with the U.S. authorities 
connected with the arrest warrants, he had to cancel his plans.151 Secondly, Al-Bashir 
is still the acting President of the Sudan. The ICC was unable to enforce the both 
arrest warrants. Apart from some practical travel restrictions for Al-Bashir, the 
impact of the issued arrest warrants was of little consequence. Thirdly, the general 
human right situation within the borders of the Sudan is still critical.152  
Even both cases may appear, on the first view, very different, they however share 
important similarities: The ICC undertook real and concrete measures against 
relevant and powerful accused persons involved in on-going conflicts. This has 
compromised a negotiated solution. The ICC was not able to enforce its arrest 
warrants. The accused individuals are still involved in Human Rights violation. It 
was from the outset questionable whether the ICC is able to enforce the issued arrest 
warrants.   
b) Alternative Solutions in Conflict Situations 
In negotiations for a peaceful transforming process, several alternative ‘punishments’ 
and traditional justice concepts are thinkable. Throughout the course of history, at 
least four main groups of alternatives had widespread used around the world. 
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  AU	   Assembly,	   Decision	   on	   the	   Report	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   the	   Commission	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   the	   Abuse	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   the	   Principle	   of	  
Universal	  	  Jurisdiction,	  June/July	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  Press	  Statement	  of	  AU	  Commissioner,	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  Oko,	  p.	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  African	  Union,	  Peace	  and	  Security	  Council	  (AU),	  Communique	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  the	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  Meeting,	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  July	  2008,	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   Omar	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   York	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   General	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  Watch,	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Firstly, the so called ‘truth and reconciliation commissions’ must be considered. 
These instruments try to determine the occurred wrong and preserve the knowledge 
or findings of these wrongs for future generations.153 The general concept behind this 
idea is that perpetrators can escape punishment if they confess the committed crimes 
and help in finding and determining the truth.154 Such resolutions can be found, first 
and foremost, in Africa and South America, for instance in South Africa,155 Sierra 
Leone156 or Chile.157 This solution – at least in this absolute form – seems to be 
unthinkable in the Western World or under the concept of the Rome Statute, 
although also in many Western law systems or within the Rome Statute a confession 
of the perpetrator generally leads to a milder punishment.158  
Secondly, it must be mentioned a concept that focuses on providing just reparation 
for the victims with an abandonment of ‘common’ sanctions of criminal law. It was 
practiced for instance after the World War II in Germany.159 Additionally, in Rwanda 
after the genocide in 1994 many discussions about this possibility arose, although the 
high number of victims and above all the lack of sufficient funds established a 
crucial obstacle.160 It is clear that full reparation in cases of the worst international 
crimes is from the outset impossible. On the other hand, even a partly reparation 
could help the victims or their families and should be considered as a general 
possibility in the interest of victims. Additionally, it requires a special sacrifice from 
perpetrators, especially in case where such a reparations goes behind the possibilities 
existing within the common tort law. 
Thirdly, amnesties are a widespread practice used in past.161 Amnesties can be 
granted in many different ways. They can be granted to certain accused persons or 
even to all possible perpetrators. Amnesties can also be granted based on a 
demonstration of a certain behaviour of the perpetrator, such as a confession of the 
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wrong-doing. On the other side, they are also thinkable without any confession or 
sacrifice by the perpetrator. Examples for such a ‘general’ amnesty can be found, for 
instance, in the history of Spain after the end of the Franco regime162 or in the 
Ugandan Amnesty Act of 2000.163   
Lastly, a solely practical and political solution must be considered. The exile in a 
third country became a long tradition in the past and appears relevant today. There 
are a long list of such cases, for instance the German Kaiser Wilhelm II after World 
War I in the Netherlands (1918-1941), the former dictator of Uganda Idi Amin in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1979-2003), the ex-dictator of the Central African 
Republic Jean-Bédel Bokassa in France (1979-1986), the former president of the 
Philippines Ferdinand Marcos in USA (1986-1990), the ex-dictator of Haiti Jean-
Claude Duvalier in France (1986-2011),the former leader of the German Democratic 
Republic Erich Honecker in Chile (1993-1994), the former president of Peru Alberto 
Fujimori in Japan (2000-2005), the former president of Liberia Charles Taylor in 
Nigeria (2003-2006) and more recently, the former dictator of Tunisia in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.164 Not long ago, the granting of exile was taken seriously 
into consideration in several situations. Such considerations include; Al-Qaddafi 
(Libya), Saleh (Yemen) or Assad (Syria).165 It would be hypocritical not to consider 
this as a practical solution in the interest of the victims in a conflict. One might even 
argue that such a solution became part of the customary international law, because of 
its widespread recognition in preventing future human rights violations (opinio iuris) 
and it widespread practice over a long period of time (consuetudo).166 
These examples show that beside the common criminal law measures, other forms of 
reaction (‘justice’) to crimes in the context of human rights violation exist. Countries 
all around the world and with different cultural backgrounds benefited from such 
concepts in cases that were complex and had widespread violation of human rights. 
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c) ‘Peace v. Justice’ within the concept of the Rome Statute 
Generally, it is irrefutable that the concept of the Rome Statute gives the ICC, the 
Prosecutor and the UN Security Council the possibilities of reacting to ongoing 
negotiations between the conflict parties and to abstain (at least temporarily) from 
measures against involved persons to avoid negative effects for a peaceful solution of 
the conflict and a further aggravation of the human rights situation.167 Such general 
possibilities are for instance included in Articles, 17 (1), 53 (1) (c), 53 (2) (c) and 16 
Rome Statute. The more difficult question is how far these possibilities can reach. It 
is argued that such possibilities be limited to the ‘interest of justice’ and only 
temporarily and not be allowed to evolve into an amnesty.168 But is a common 
criminal procedure (at national or international level) really cogent necessary in the 
‘interest of justice’ and ‘to avoid impunity’? However, if the Rome Statute from the 
outset does not recognizes these alternative conflict-solution-models, for a 
perpetrator in an on-going conflict situation, there will be little incentives to continue 
to seek a peaceful solution in negotiations. In such cases, the perpetrator will be 
prosecuted before the ICC after the end of the conflict. Between the conflict parties 
negotiated solutions (exile, amnesties or truth and reconciliation commissions) could 
become never relevant, at least not permanently. A perpetrator, who knows from the 
onset that exclusion of measures by the ICC is only temporarily, will normally have 
no relevant incentive in searching for a peaceful solution to end the conflict. Because 
of this, it must be answered at first the questions, whether the Rome Statute 
recognize the mentioned alternative solutions (truth and reconciliation commissions, 
exile, amnesties, reparation) in general and, if yes, whether such alternative solutions 
can lead to a complete and permanent exclusion of common criminal law measures. 
aa) System of Complementarity, Article 17 Rome Statute  
An important possible (permanent) exception or possibility to recognize such 
alternative conflict-solution-models can emanate from the system of 
complementarity.169 According to Article 17 (1) of the Rome Statute  
‘…, the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where:  
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The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction 
over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution;’ 
This exception clause could give the ICC a substantial scope in considering special 
situations or conflict solution possibilities, such as the granting of asylum in a third 
state, the respect for the installation and the outcome of national truth and 
reconciliation commissions or in respecting national amnesties. 
In considering the pure wording of this clause, two points seems of a special 
importance. Firstly, special attention needs to be given to the fact that this provision 
exclusively, refers to the proceedings (investigation and prosecution), and not to the 
outcome of these measures.170 In general, this implies that the Rome Statute in this 
context does not claim a certain outcome. Especially, it does not require similar 
sentences like under the Rome Statute or national criminal law.  Secondly, even if 
the word ‘prosecute’ from a western view and in the context of the Rome Statute 
could indicate the necessity for a trial before a common criminal court, such an 
interpretation is by no means definitive.  The word ‘prosecute’ is not restricted to the 
criminal law itself. It may also be used in more general law context with the meaning 
of ‘to commence and carry out a legal action’.171 Additionally, it should be taken 
into account that the Rome Statute itself presents only a blend of legal traditions.172 
As a result of this, it seems in general, critical to take only one certain view. Instead, 
all different legal traditions must be considered. Other alternative or traditional 
‘punishment’ methods by national authorities, such as truth and reconciliation 
commissions, cannot be excluded from the onset. Therefore, even under the Rome 
Statute, it appears possible that ‘justice’ can exist and ‘impunity’ can be avoided, 
even without a common criminal law procedure and the following normal criminal 
sentences.  
bb) Discretion of the Prosecutor 
A further important indication for the general possibility to react to an on-going 
conflict and to consider alternative conflict solutions can be found within Articles 53 
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(1) (c) and 53 (2) (c) Rome Statute. According to these rules, the Prosecutor can 
abstain from investigations or a prosecution, if such an action is not in the ‘interest of 
justice’. For this decision the Prosecutor has to take into account beside the gravity of 
the crime or the perpetrator’s role within the crime, the interest of the victims.173 
Although this provision contains some additional advices how the term ‘justice’ has 
to be understood (the gravity of crime or the interest of victims), however, the 
vagueness of the criterions leaves a substantial room for interpretation.174 Therefore, 
it seems that even in a case of committed high gravity crimes, it is possible to abstain 
from a prosecution. If in such a case, a prosecution would hinder a peaceful solution 
and threaten the lives of many people who could be possible victims, the interests of 
these victims could outweigh the gravity of the already committed crime. As a result 
of this, it becomes unchallengeable that the Prosecutor can and has to consider 
human rights violation in an on-going conflict and the consequences of a possible 
negotiated peace solution.175  
cc) Discretion of the UN Security Council, Article 16 Rome Statute 
Furthermore, the possibilities of the UN Security Council according to Article 16 of 
the Rome Statute must be considered. Whereas, both the ICC and the Prosecutor 
cannot abstain limitlessly from common criminal actions against an accused 
person,176 the UN Security Council hasn’t to consider any normative limits under the 
Rome Statute itself. Article 16 of the Rome Statute contains no additional 
requirements and only limited the period of such a deferral to twelve months.177 The 
UN Security Council is also not obligated to the general underlying principles of the 
Rome Statute. Above all, it is not bound by the general objective to avoid impunity 
or to achieve justice for all. In acting under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the UN 
Security Council is only obligated to Chapter VII of the UN Charter to ‘maintain or 
restore peace and security’, Article 42 UN Charter. The objectives of the Rome 
Statute such as achieving ‘justice’ and ‘avoiding impunity’ play no role for its 
decision. This means that even the Rome Statute itself and the state parties recognize 
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that there are cases, where ‘justice’ not exists and where peace and security or the 
interest of victims must give preference to the interests of justice – clear and at any 
price. 
In conclusion, the ICC itself, the Prosecutor, and the UN Security Council have 
sufficient possibilities to react to special situations in an on-going conflict and human 
rights violations. Especially, they can and have to consider the interests of the 
affected people. The mentioned cases show that the concepts of ‘justice for all’ and 
of ‘avoiding impunity’ under the Rome Statute are much wider than it seems since 
the first view. The Rome Statute itself contains several clauses, which allows 
recognition of alternative conflict-solutions-models and even permanent divergences 
from the explicit, within the Rome Statute or within the national criminal law 
systems mentioned punishments and sentences. In the case of an intervention by the 
UN Security Council under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, it can be waived 
completely to the objectives of ‘justice for all’ and of ‘avoiding impunity’. On the 
other hand, these general possibilities cannot mean that the ICC and the Prosecutor 
have to accept any national alternative conflict solution mandatorily. Instead, both 
have to examine such efforts seriously and have to weight all the affected interest. 
Such relevant interests can be for instance, a cultural and historical background in 
conflict solution of the affected people, regional characteristics, expectable 
developments of the conflict situation and their consequences, the gravity of the 
crime and the interests of the (possible) victims.178 It is clear that such decisions are 
not easy and that a lot of conditions must be taken into account. However, such 
difficult considerations are the original task of every court. In fulfilling this 
obligation and determining the concept of ‘justice’ within the Rome Statute, the ICC 
should not take a too narrow view, but rather consider all the different legal traditions 
of state parties. The Rome Statute itself includes provisions that make such a 
consideration possible.  
Kofi Annan in his address during the Review Conference of the Rome Statute in 
Kampala 2010 put it straight:179  
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‘…one thing is clear:  the time has passed when we might speak of peace 
versus justice, or think of them as somehow opposed to each other. Between 
war and peace must first come something else:  reconciliation, forgiveness, a 
mending of the social fabric.  These are the hand-maidens of peace and 
justice.’ 
There is nothing left to be added.   
At this point it must be revisited the initial question, whether measures of the ICC in 
on-going conflict situations can become even counterproductive for generally 
existing utilitarian effects. The examples aforementioned, the comprehensive 
discussion about ‘peace v. justice’ and the reaction of involved stakeholders, clearly 
shows that an intervention of the ICC in an on-going conflict can hinder a prompt 
peaceful solution of a conflict and therefore can lead to negative consequences for 
human rights. On the other hand, it was presented that several normative provisions 
to address such dangers within the Rome Statute exist. The ICC and the Prosecutor 
can and have to consider efforts of a perpetrator in finding a peaceful solution and 
negotiating alternative conflict-solution-models. They have to consider all relevant 
circumstances and effected interest. Even a permanent and complete exclusion of 
common criminal sentences, which is probably, the strongest incentive for a relevant 
powerful perpetrator to end an on-going conflict and make a transition possible, 
seems possibly under the system of the Rome Statute. If such efforts lead to a quick 
end of the conflict, prevent massive future human rights violations, and enable  
conflicting parties to find a solid solution for the future (such as the installation of a 
truth or reconciliation commission), there is no reason why a prosecution before the 
ICC should be necessary in the ‘interest of justice’. The ICC and the Prosecutor must 
decide, whether and which concrete measures they consider, in every individual on-
going conflict. However, within this decision they have to consider strongly the 
consequences for the human rights situation and that ‘justice’ under the Rome Statue 
can be understood much wider than it seems on the first view. For the two mentioned 
examples of Josef Kony and Omar al-Bashir, it means that the actions of the 
Prosecutor and the ICC were inappropriately implemented. In these cases, on the one 
side, from the outset concrete doubts existed on whether the ICC can enforce the 
issued arrest. On the other side, concrete concerns were expressed that negotiations 
will become much more difficult.  If it is from the onset, likely that measures taken 
by the Court cannot be enforced in practice, it offers little or no benefit, to take such 
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measures against a concrete person and risk ending the much needed negotiations 
and any possibility of stopping an on-going conflict.  
3. (Human) Rights of the Perpetrators 
The recognition of the (human) rights of the perpetrators can become another crucial 
point for the effectiveness of the ICC in preventing further human rights violations. 
From the first viewpoint, this strong connection between this point and the 
effectiveness of the ICL system seams not obvious. However, it must be restated that 
the ICC, in fulfilling its obligations in the different contexts, is strongly dependent on 
the (sometimes voluntary) participation of the state parties and other involved 
stakeholders. Therefore, the more people, communities or countries don’t accept the 
work of the ICC as justified and fair, the more difficult work of the Court will 
become.  
Two points are of a special relevance and both recently, became important in the 
context of the relationship between the ICC and Africa. Firstly, the general principle 
of equality must be considered. Could it be a defence in a criminal procedure, if the 
ICC handles similar cases unequally? Can an accused individual argue that the Court 
does not prosecute a person in an equivalent case or situation? Secondly, in this 
context, the general principle or right to a fair trial must be taken into account. The 
ICL faces regularly, large, complex and often vast situations that must be solved. The 
distinction between victims and perpetrators is most times difficult to achieve and the 
trial takes place in most cases, thousands of miles from the place where the certain 
crimes occurred. As a consequence of these circumstances, a conflicting party, which 
is still in power during the investigation could influence and manipulate evidences to 
pursue its own political interests. 
 
a) Equality in Prosecution of the ICC 
Since the French Revolution in 1789, the general principle of equality before the law 
found its way to most countries around the world. Today, equality is a grounding 
principle in most human rights documents. Such provisions are found in Article 14 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), in Article 3 of the African 
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Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), and in Article II of the American 
Declaration of the Right and Duties of Man (ADRDM). Additionally, most national 
constitutions include this right as a grounding principle of their state systems.180 
During the last decade, criticism from African countries concerning the equality of 
the prosecution of the ICC increased permanently, and reached a new high during the 
AU summit 2013. It appears that now, a situation emerged where a whole continent 
unanimously, rejected the decisions and prosecutions of the Court as unequal. 
In 2011 Jean Ping, Commissioner of the African Union, pointed out: 181 
‘The ICC's active cases all target crimes against humanity committed in the 
African states of Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African 
Republic, Uganda and Kenya. Why not Argentina, why not Myanmar ... why 
not Iraq?’  
An examination of this position requires that the following points to be clarified. 
Firstly, it must be asked whether such an argument can be recognized as a defence in 
criminal law and especially under the system of the Rome Statute. Secondly, the 
mentioned examples must be examined for verification they can really prove an 
inequality in the prosecution. 
aa) Inequality in Prosecution as a Defence under the Rome Statute? 
The first question to answer is, whether an inequality in prosecution by the ICC can 
be used generally as a legal defence within the system of the Rome Statute. 
Assuming that the ICC prosecutes or trials only one of two identical cases and 
without any comprehensible reason given, the following question can be posed. Can 
the prosecuted perpetrator arguing that this prosecution is violating the principle of 
equality before the law and in this way avoid a conviction?  
The Rome Statute itself contains no clear indication for such a legal defence. The 
word ‘equal’ and ‘equality’ appears only in few and different contexts within the 
Rome Statute, like in Articles 27, 54 and 67 Rome Statute. However, it seems 
possible to resort to the more fundamental principles and goals of the Rome Statute 
to answer this question. On the one hand, it could be argued that the achievement of 
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one of the main goals of the Rome Statute, namely ‘to achieve justice’ would be 
foreclosed. It seems difficult to speak about ‘justice’, if only selected perpetrators of 
those that committed a similar crime will be prosecuted and convicted. In 
recognizing this defence, the ICC would be forced to handle same cases in the same 
way. On the other hand, this would lead to a situation whereby, all prosecuted 
perpetrators could use such a defence, if the ICC does not prosecute one perpetrator 
in a similar case, without any comprehensible reason given.  In such a case all 
perpetrators would stay unpunished, even all of them committed the certain 
international crime. This would contradict another main goal of the Rome Statute – 
to end impunity.  
Therefore, the answer must be sought between these two views. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional Court) has principally denied such 
a defence in the national criminal law in Germany.182 Even so, it has clarified that 
such defence should be possible in exceptional cases of a systematic prosecution of 
only some perpetrators without any reasonable grounds.183 Such a distinct 
consideration also seems appropriate within the Rome Statute. The two concurrent 
goals (to achieve justice and to avoid impunity) should be appropriate balanced. 
Therefore, the equality argument must be denied as defence in general. Even when 
an accused individual can find a certain similar case, which the ICC failed to 
prosecute, the goal of ending impunity must take priority. However, if the ICC 
prosecutes systematically, only certain cases of similar situations without any 
reasonable grounds, such a defence based on the principle of equality must be 
possible. Such a systematic ‘targeting’ without comprehensible reasons cannot be 
(longer) in the interest of ‘justice’.  
bb) Examples of the AU 
If one takes this result into account and considers the certain and concrete 
accusations by the African Union, it becomes clear that the argument of equality 
cannot be used against an on-going investigation and prosecutions of the African 
cases by the ICC.  
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Firstly, the fact that most investigation and prosecutions of the ICC are focused on 
situations in Africa can deliver no evidence for an ICC’s arbitrary prosecution of 
African situations. Such a ‘targeting-situation’ would be normal, if relevant crimes 
only occurred in treaty-bound states in Africa. In this context, it should be repeated 
that at one side a large number of African countries have signed and ratified the 
Rome Statute and that at the other side a large number and powerful nations or states 
in conflict regions outside Africa are still not state-parties to the Rome Statute. For 
instance, if on the territory of these non-state-parties, international crimes occur or 
citizen of these countries commit crimes on the territory of a non-state-party, a 
jurisdiction of the ICC can only be established in the exceptional case of a referral by 
the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
Secondly, in several by the AU mentioned examples, the concrete actions were not 
grounded on an original decision of the ICC, but rather on a referral by the affected 
country (Uganda)184 or a referral by the UN Security Council (Sudan).185 
Additionally, several examples by the AU for an ICC’s failure to act in cases outside 
Africa are from the outset inappropriate to prove an unequal and arbitrary 
prosecution by the ICC. Myanmar and the Iraq are not state-parties to the Rome 
Statute.186 Additionally, the USA whose troops allegedly committed human rights 
violations in Iraq, are not a state-party of the Rome statute.187 This means that the 
ICC has principally, no jurisdiction about these cases. Such a jurisdiction of the 
Court could be established only through a referral by the UN Security Council, 
Article 13 (a) Rome Statute. If the UN Security Council refers one case to the 
Prosecutor and does not do this in another similar case, the ICC cannot be accused of 
an unequal prosecution. In this case, the referral by the UN Security Council is the 
main and obligatory reason for a prosecution, not an (unequal) decision by the ICC 
or the Prosecutor. Even the situation in Argentina, which is now a state party of the 
Rome Statute,188 cannot be used as an example for an unequal prosecution. The so 
popularly known ‘Dirty War’ in Argentina with widespread and massive human 
rights violations occurred between 1976 and 1983.189 According Article 11 (1) Rome 
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Statute the Court ‘has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the 
entry into force of this Statute.’ As a result of this, the ICC has from the onset, no 
jurisdiction and possibility to start investigations or prosecutions in cases occurred 
during this violent era in Argentina.  
In conclusion, it must be said that an unequal prosecution of cases by the ICC 
generally, cannot establish a legal defence for a prosecuted individual. Such a formal 
defence, based on the principle of equality, can come into consideration only if the 
ICC prosecutes systematically only certain of similar cases without any reasonable 
grounds. The AU mentioned cases cannot be anywhere near supply evidences for 
such a systematically unequal prosecution.  
b) Fair Trial  
The principle of a fair trial can become an additional influence to the acceptance of 
the work done by the Court and therefore help or hinder ICC in preventing future 
human rights violations. If the people, communities or countries don’t accept the 
work of the ICC as justified and fair, it will become more difficult for the Court to 
enforce or to communicate its utilitarian elements. 
Difficulties with the principle of fair trial can occur within the work of the ICC in 
many different ways. The Rome Statute, as a blend of different legal traditions, 
includes only a minimum of fair trial standards, e.g. Articles 55 (2), 66, 67 Rome 
Statute. Many national criminal law systems use higher fair trial standards that are 
not applicable within an ICC trial. These lowered requirements were for instance one 
main argument by the USA in opposing the Rome Statute and the ICC.190 In this 
context it was argued that the Rome Statute does not recognize a jury-trial, a right to 
a speedy or public trial, and a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.191  
This section focuses on a special aspect within the many different fair trial problems, 
which became relevant recently in two African situations. It was argued that African 
conflict parties in the past tried to use the ICC to pursue their own political interest 
and to combat political opponents.192 For this they took advantage of the ICC’s 
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particular difficulties in solving a special situation.193 In cases of Uganda and Sudan, 
it was well advocated that manipulations and canalizations of evidences were 
possible for the government, as well as for rebels, and that such manipulative 
treatments can lead to (unintended) partial actions of the ICC against one conflict 
party.194  
In looking at the special situation of the ICC in comparison to the national criminal 
law, it becomes clear that such manipulations or canalizations of evidences by a 
conflict party are possible. The ICC faces several additional problems to determine 
the truth.195 Such conflicts are usually and extremely complex. The trial takes place 
regularly far away from the place where the crimes occurred. The access to 
evidences and testimonies is more limited and depends strongly on the goodwill of 
the actual government in the country or area. Sometimes it is even difficult to distin-
guish between perpetrators and victims, soldiers and terrorists, and policeman and 
criminals.196 It can be stated that the ICC and the Prosecutor in this context have ‘no 
more powers than any tourist in a foreign State’.197	  	  
In summary, it becomes obvious that the ICC is in an extremely difficult situation. It 
is clear that also national criminal courts have to verify the validity of the evidences. 
However, the ICC is in this context much more imperilled by such manipulations. If 
it wants to avoid an infringement of the fair trial principle, it must be sure that there 
is no manipulation or canalization of evidences. It must be carefully examine any 
indications for such manipulations or political intentions of the conflict parties. If it 
cannot definitely exclude such manipulation or canalization, it must be very careful 
to take measures exclusively against one of the conflict party. Otherwise, the right of 
a fair trial could be infringed, the acceptances of measures by the Court would be 
lowered, and finally the utilitarian effects become lower.   
4.  Conclusion 
In this Chapter it was shown that in ICL and above all, in Africa, several special 
problems (‘peace v. justice’ / rights of the accused persons) can arise and diminish 
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the utilitarian effects of the ICC. In the cases of on-going conflicts, it was 
demonstrated that an intervention of the Court in such a situation can without a 
doubt, hinder further negotiations and a peaceful solution of the conflict.  However, 
it was possible to find solutions within the Rome Statute, to react sufficiently, to 
these cases, recognize the interests of the (further) victims adequately, and also take 
alternative conflict solutions into account. Furthermore, it was shown that the rights 
of the accused persons can play a special role for the ability of the ICC in preventing 
future human rights violations and that these must be seriously taken into account in 
this context. If the ICC does not prosecute similar cases equally or does not 
recognize procedural rights of accused persons sufficiently, the ICC and its decisions 
can both be rejected. Because the ICC is strongly dependent from the participation of 
the whole international community, a lack of acceptance would directly decrease the 
utilitarian effects and weaken the ability of the ICC to prevent future human rights 
violations. The developments in Africa have clearly shown this danger exists. If 
certain countries or state parties criticise the work of the ICC or deny a co-operation 
with the Court, it will clearly have a negative influence on the utilitarian effects of 
the ICC. In the case of Africa the danger seems even higher. If a whole continent and 
a whole regional organisation seriously refuse to co-operate with the ICC, it could 











Within this work it was possible to show that the potential of the ICC to prevent 
future human rights violations in general cannot be challenged.  The fact that actually 
no reliable empirical data (researches or statistics) exist, which can deliver clear and 
definitive evidences that the work of the ICC has prevented human rights violation, 
is not an obstacle to this outcome.  
In Chapter I, it was shown that the general ability of national criminal law in 
preventing future crimes cannot be seriously contested. There are several utilitarian 
effects that emanated from the common national criminal law systems: deterrence of 
potential perpetrators, just incapacitation of convicted perpetrators, transforming 
elements, and restorative or condemnation elements. Although, strong critics 
concerning some of these effects still exist, and national statistics and researches 
about these effects have doubtlessly weak points, when one considers the whole 
entirety of the different utilitarianism effects, the different points of criticism cannot 
be upheld. If one utilitarianism effect fails in a special case, often other effects 
become relevant. Furthermore, in modern societies, criminal law is only one 
important pillar to prevent future crimes. Other measures beyond the criminal law, 
such as enlightenment and education, exist. They are equally important in preventing 
future crimes. However, it must be clarified that all these utilitarian effects and 
additional measures will be unable to completely prevent future crimes. The opposite 
view would be illusorily – at least if considering a foreseeable future. 
Within Chapter II and III, it was clarified that notwithstanding the large and crucial 
differences between the national and the international level of criminal law, the 
common utilitarian effects of domestic punishment can also be transferred to ICL. 
Therefore the role of the ICC within the international human right protection system 
cannot seriously be denied, even though no resort to sufficient empirical data 
(researches and statistics) to prove such an importance of the Court is possible.  The 
main distinctions that exist between the two levels of criminal law, such as the 
different ‘nature of the relevant crimes’, the ‘lack of a sovereign’, the lack of a 
Court’s own executive power under the Rome Statute or the existence of the 
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‘outstanding position of perpetrators’ in international crime situations can perhaps 
influence or weaken the effectiveness of certain utilitarian effects at the international 
level. However, every one of these effects has without a doubt, a justification in ICL 
an especially, under the Rome Statute. The most important reason for these findings 
was surely the establishment of the first permanent international court. With this 
milestone, a prosecution and conviction of persons accused of committing 
international crimes, is no longer unlikely. Even in cases with no original treaty-
based jurisdiction, the ‘danger’ for perpetrators to become prosecuted is much higher 
now. In such cases today, ‘only’ a referral of the UN Security Council to the ICC is 
necessary, and there is no need for a completely new establishment of an ad-hoc 
tribunal. Additionally, it must be taken into account that the ICC has not reached its 
full capacity, that the Rome Statute was designed from the onset as only one pillar 
within the human rights protection system, and that the positive consequences for 
human rights can be enormous if only one in hundreds potential perpetrators does not 
commit international crimes because of the existence of the ICC. In light of these 
points, a generally outstanding importance of the Rome Statute in preventing future 
human rights violations cannot be seriously challenged. 
Chapter IV has considered two special African situations and it was shown that the 
work of the Court could become counterproductive to the protection of human rights. 
In an on-going conflict with widespread human rights violations, measures taken by 
the Court can be the crucial reason for the failure of a peaceful solution and an 
immediate cessation of the violence. In such cases, the ICC is challenged to weight 
the arguments from the ‘peace v. justice’ discussion, accurately. The Rome Statute 
itself gives all stakeholders a wide discretion to reflect upon all the conflicting 
interests, and especially, the human right situation at hand. Within the Rome Statute, 
as a blend of different national and/or regional legal systems and traditions, regularly 
more room for interpretation of the provisions exist. For instance, an interpretation of 
‘justice’ can be very different, depending on whether one considers this point from a 
western or an African perspective. Therefore, it is the usual task of the Court to 
interpret the normative law of the Rome Statute by taking all relevant circumstances 
into account and weighting out all the different interests. It seems, in general, 
possible to recognize alternative conflict-solution-models and to take regional and 
cultural characteristics into account. Even to refrain permanently from imposing the 
within the Rome Statute explicitly mentioned criminal sentences seems possible – 
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especially, if thereby widespread future human rights violations in on-going conflicts 
can be prevented. Additionally, it was shown that an alleged infringement of the 
rights of the accused persons by the ICC can have a crucial influence on its ability to 
prevent future human rights and can even challenge the ICC’s very existence as a 
whole. The system of the Rome Statute depends in many ways on a strong support of 
the state parties and other involved actors. So, if such needed support is absent 
because the ICC is accused of acting in a discriminatory manner or violating 
important procedural rights of the accused persons, the proper functioning of the 
Court becomes very difficult. However, when a whole continent opposes the ICC 
then its very existence in general, could be challenged, regardless of whether the 
arguments used can convince in a legal view or not. 
Although this thesis has shown that the ICC already today is playing an important 
role in the international human rights protection system, there is still room for 
improvement. The demonstrated shortcomings and problems indicate the most 
necessary enhancements: 
1. The most important point seems to be the necessity to extend the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. A large number of countries in the world, and especially, big and 
powerful states that regularly involved in violent conflicts are not state party of 
the Rome Statute. Of course, it is not possible to force these countries to ratify the 
treaty. However, a strong promotion of the ideas of the Rome Statute and take the 
concerns of the non-state-parties seriously would significantly facilitate an 
extension of the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
2. A similar crucial extension of prosecutions of international crimes and therefore, 
an increase of the utilitarian effects could be reached through a stronger 
implementation of the international criminal law in national criminal law 
systems. The Rome Statute itself provides for the prosecution of only the worst 
cases and the worst perpetrators. Minor perpetrators have to be prosecuted by 
national criminal law systems. In the case of committed international core crimes 
international customary criminal provisions and universal jurisdiction exist. As a 
result, national criminal courts in all countries, regardless of the place where the 
crime was committed and which nationality the perpetrator has, have jurisdiction 
about the crime and can normally apply customary ICL. However, the normative 
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and especially the practical implementation of such jurisdiction in national law 
systems seem of a special importance for a consistent and equal prosecution of 
international crimes.  
3. The concept of ‘justice’ within the Rome Statute has to be understood in a much 
broader context than solely, to punish the perpetrators with the common criminal 
sentences (imprisonment). The Rome Statute includes sufficient room for such a 
wider interpretation. Any other view would from the onset lead to intractable 
conflicts in cases where nearly the whole population of a country became either 
perpetrators or victims. In such very complex situations alternative conflict-
solution-models could be the only possible way to resolve the conflict. So, why 
should the ICC not take such encouraging alternative measures into account? 
4. The ICC should consider regional context more seriously. The Rome Statute 
represents only a blend of different legal systems and traditions. The crucial 
differences between these legal traditions must be taken into account. Several 
provisions within the statute grant the Court sufficient room for differentiation 
and special consideration. In this context the Court should be careful not to show 
rigid preference of any these legal traditions to others.  
5. Expectation about the ICC should be not an unrealistically high. It should be 
clarified that it will be not possible to prevent all (international) crimes and 
human rights violations in future. Additionally, the Rome Statute can be only one 
pillar in reaching this goal. Therefore, it seems from the onset wrong to qualify 
and promote the ICC as the ‘ultimate’ instrument in preventing future human 
rights violations. In the case of occurring massive human rights violation or 
international crimes in the future, it would be the perfect argument for opponents 
to argue against a justification of the Court. 
6. In the case of on-going conflicts, the ICC and the Prosecutor must seriously 
consider the consequences of early and against certain persons directed measures, 
especially, those ones that can become a direct influence to the human rights 
situation. If it appears likely that the by the ICC intended measures cannot be 
enforced in practice and such intended measures will become a negative 
influence to negotiations between the conflict parties and further human rights 
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violations threatens, than there can be generally no justification for such 
measures.  
7. The ICC has to consider stringently, the equality aspects in investigation and 
prosecution. Even when an inequality in prosecution cannot be used as a legal 
defence in general, the actual opposition of the AU shows clearly, possible 
crucial consequences, if state parties or a whole regional organisation just feel 
unjustly threated.  
8. The Court must seriously recognize procedural rights of the accused persons. It 
must especially, avoid being used as an instrument to combat political opponents 
and to settle political scores. The negative consequences could be the same like in 
a case of unequal prosecution.  
So, if the ICC can consider these points, it seems that the actual ability of the Court 
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